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On The Many Flavors of Capitalism or
Reflections on Schumpeter's Ghost
JOHN HENRY SCHLEGELt
For those of us who grew up in the Fifties and early
Sixties there was only one variety of capitalism. While it
may have seemed to some as a time that instantiated "The
End of Ideology,"1 the reigning, deeply entrenched ideology
contrasted a simplified capitalism with a monolithic
socialism. That is what was taught to high school students
and even to undergraduates taking introductory classes in
economics-all I ever enrolled in 2-at reputable institutions.
There was, of course, that odd middle category, the
regulated economy, but it was reasonably apparent that
such was a compromise, seen by some as a dangerous
deviation from, and by others as a necessary taming of, the
real thing. A check with my children, high school students
in the Nineties, indicates that such was the essence of what
they were taught and at a quite good high school.
When I reached law school at the University of Chicago
in 1964 there was only one capitalism too. The early sprouts
of what became Law and Economics, visible only in the
anti-trust class, were seen by many of us as but an
ideologically driven simplification of a more complex, but
uniform, oligopolistic capitalism, the only capitalism we
could conceive of. And though actively involved in the
Critical Legal Studies movement in the late Seventies and
early Eighties and so exposed to many variants of Marxian,
t Professor of Law and Roger and Karen Jones Faculty Scholar, State
University of New York at Buffalo.
1. DANIEL BELL, THE END OF IDEOLOGY: ON THE EXHAUSTION OF POLITICAL
IDEAS IN THE FIFTIES (2d rev. ed. 1962).
2. Both courses-micro and macro-were taught by the late Robert Eisner, a
steadfast Keynesian. He was surprised when thirty-five years later I told him
that these courses had kept me in good stead for all those years.
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and so socialist, understandings of economics, it still never
occurred to me that there might be multiple varieties of
capitalism. Although intellectually I knew of the Marxian
notion of capitalism's three periods-commercial, industrial,
and financial-somehow that historical narrative never
managed to penetrate my thick skull as an opening in the
direction of understanding that there might be multiple
forms of capitalism extant at the same time. And though I
am singularly pig-headed, I doubt that it penetrated many
other skulls in that way either. Indeed, it was not until the
late Eighties, when on a sabbatical in Spain, that I began to
see in the International Herald Tribune's coverage of the
various European economies the possibility that there might
be multiple flavors of capitalism. This proposition became
increasingly clear with the growth, and temporary demise, of
the "Asian Tigers."3 Still, little in the public or law school
press has recognized this fact.
This protracted episode of ideological blindness can be
traced back to the 1880s political opposition to "godless"
socialism on the part of America's industrial elite. Still, I
doubt whether such blindness provided the entire reason
why academic economics seems never to have been able to
accommodate the notion that there might be other than one
capitalist system. 4 The scientific imperative that dominates
contemporary academic life is likely also to have played
some part in this collective obtuseness of which my life is
only a small part. While it might be interesting to
investigate intensively the respective contribution of this
longstanding ideology of capitalism and the norms of
scientific inquiry to the decision of most economists to
3. Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan are the generally
agreed members of this group. At various times arguments have been made for
including variously Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia.
4. ANDREW SHONFIELD, MODERN CAPITALISM: THE CHANGING BALANCE OF
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE POWER (1965), starts a small literature on comparative
economic systems that has continued to occupy some academics. That said, it is
a literature that has had very little impact on the vast majority of neo-classical
economists and draws more interest from the political scientists. Some parts of
the popular press have caught on; books such as DANIEL YERGIN & JOSEPH
STANISLAW, THE COMMANDING HEIGHTS: THE BATTLE BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND
THE MARKETPLACE THAT IS REMAKING THE MODERN WORLD (1998) implicitly
understand. Law and economics scholars have not focused on these questions,
since few work outside the model of perfect competition deformed only by
government regulation in the service of special interests.
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assume a single type of capitalism with a tolerably
competitive market, doing so is a task for others. All I can
offer in this context is a brief outline of the role in
contemporary economic thought of what David Hollinger
once called the "scientific ideal."5
In the name of building a science, or so it is said,
academic economic models since the 1950s have expressed a
radically simplified, singular capitalism in order to yield
predictable results. Paul Krugman, for example, has
asserted that one of the reasons that the field of development
economics has not prospered is that it could not build the
testable mathematical models that provided equilibrated,
and so determinate, results upon which economic science
has been built.6 He has also noted that this mathematical
deficiency likewise undermined work on oligopolistic
competition. A sophisticated modeling of oligopoly might
have led toward a simple binary model that contrasted
oligopolistic and perfect competition as different species of
the genus capitalism. It is sad that it did not, just as it is
sad that Galbraith's work on this topic got normalized into
an argument about the proper degree of regulatory
intrusion into the "free market. ' 7 Scientism is what such a
methodological constriction of the knowable is usually called.
Whatever the reason or reasons that further
investigation might disclose for the continued devotion of
academic economics to a singular capitalism, given this
devotion it is particularly notable when a mainstream
economist of the age and station of William J. Baumol,
admittedly with the help of two substantially younger
colleagues, produces a book, Good Capitalism, Bad
Capitalism,8 based on the recognition that there are
multiple varieties of capitalism. A more heterodox scholar
with a strong affinity for political economy, Robert B. Reich,
has recently authored a different, more sequential
5. DAVID A. HOLLINGER, MORRIS R. COHEN AND THE SCIENTIFIC IDEAL (1975).
6. See PAUL KRUGMAN, DEVELOPMENT, GEOGRAPHY, AND ECONOMIC THEORY 5-
6 (1995).
7. See, e.g., RICHARD PARKER, JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH: His LIFE, HIS
POLITICS, HIs ECONOMICS (2005).
8. WILLIAM J. BAUMOL, ROBERT E. LITAN & CARL J. SCHRAMM, GOOD




differentiation of capitalisms, Supercapitalism.9 And, Peter
A. Hall and David Soskice, political economists whose
disciplinary roots are in political science, somewhat earlier
offered their own differentiation of capitalisms. 10 So, it is an
appropriate time to take advantage of the opening these
scholars have provided and make an initial attempt at
understanding what one might learn from thinking about a
capitalism that is multiple, not singular. Perhaps, such a
discussion will help to push tired old arguments about
capitalism and socialism to the edge of the table around
which contemporary economic debate is had-I doubt that
they can be pushed off-in order to open a space for a broad
discussion better tied to current circumstances.
It is difficult, for me at least, to approach this topic
linearly. I doubt whether any economy is a linear structure
and my mind does not naturally work by imposing linear
structures on diffuse phenomena anyway. However, in an
attempt to help the reader navigate a path through my
brambles, let me provide this modest roadmap. I begin with
a discussion of the constructed nature of markets, the
importance of market systems or structures, and of
financings-the inter-temporal transfer of value, the factor
distinguishing capitalism from other forms of a market
economy. Thereafter, I turn to four articulations of the
varieties of capitalism.
The first is the classic Marxist one; the second, Reich's.
After presenting each of these understandings I look at its
strengths and weaknesses. The third articulation is Hall
and Soskice's. An examination of the strengths and
weaknesses of this understanding requires a long inquiry
into Douglas North's notion of "institution"11 and a similar,
through briefer, inquiry into the concept of "efficiency." The
fourth articulation is that of Baumol and his associates.
Their support for the common idea that technological
change is a driver of innovation leads to a discussion of
9. ROBERT B. REICH, SUPERCAPITALISM: THE TRANSFORMATION OF BUSINESS,
DEMOCRACY, AND EVERYDAY LIFE (2007).
10. See Peter A. Hall & David Soskice, An Introduction to Varieties of
Capitalism, in VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM: THE INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF
COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE 1 (Peter A. Hall & David Soskice eds., 2001).
11. See infra note 40.
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Schumpeter's romantic vision of the entrepreneur and the
place of change in economic life.
Next, I look at how all four of these understandings of
the varieties of capitalism manage change, a discussion
that leads quite directly to an exploration of socialism, its
relationship to capitalism, and the way it did and might
have managed economic change. I finish with two
suggestions. First, capitalisms probably vary on far more
dimensions than are suggested by the four understandings
of it that I have reviewed. Second, the question of how any
specific capitalism handles economic change is both crucial
to an understanding of that capitalism and a quite telling
insight into the nature of the society in which it is
embedded. Perhaps the second suggestion will encourage
humans to think about this aspect of their lives and others'
when considering what variety of capitalism they wish to
construct for themselves.
To begin, it is important to look theoretically at what
might possibly hold together the genus capitalmus.
Discussions of capitalism always assume that the
participants have a solid understanding of the notion of a
market. Though it is crucial to understand this notion, it is
anything but unproblematic. Much discussion proceeds as if
markets are naturally occurring phenomena, something
like the seasons or the phases of the moon. The iconic image
is often of two hunter-gatherer bands meeting quite
randomly at a stream and, having once peacefully
exchanged goods, returning every year thereafter. This is a
silly notion. Markets are among the more complicated
things that humans have constructed, a word I use quite
intentionally. Markets are also games that people play.
First, markets, like games, need rules. Those rules may
be customary, negotiated or imposed privately, and/or
negotiated or imposed by governments of all kinds. Unlike
many traditional games, the rules of a market change from
time to time. But without rules there can be no markets. Of
course without rules there can be casual exchanges.
However, even here it would not be inappropriate to note
that behind every casual exchange lies some notion of
ownership and thus of property, and maybe of contract.
This too implies a rule system.
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Standing alone, however, rule systems do not bring
markets into existence either. Rule systems are like garage
sales. Just because such a sale is announced, and even a
table full of goods provided, does not mean that anyone will
show up to buy. For example, even today futures or options
exchanges regularly establish rules that define markets for
products that too few people want to trade and so are soon
shut down. So, second, not only do markets need rules, they
also need an economic environment where people, not just
one or two, but many, might wish to trade whatever the
market might be structured to offer. The absence of such
people has led to much of the late financial unpleasantness.
The existence of rule systems that establish markets in
which people will come to buy and sell, a place, not
necessarily physical, where people may play their game,
does not, however, imply capitalism. For capitalism there
need to be not only rule systems and participants, but also
financings. 12 As my friend Bert Westbrook never tires of
explaining to students, a financing is the form of economic
activity that facilitates the inter-temporal transfer of
value. 13 To make such a transfer requires access to capital,
hence the name, capitalism. For example, if I use savings,
i.e., my own accumulated capital, to buy goods with the
expectation, really a hope, of reselling them at some future
time for more than I paid, I am participating in capitalism.
Same with taking orders for goods to be delivered in the
future. In both cases I am attempting to transfer my
present value to some point in the future, a point when I
12. Hardly a repository of great wisdom, but nevertheless indicative of the
general middle brow understanding, Wikipedia defines capitalism as "the
economic system in which the means of production are owned by private persons,
and operated for profit and where investments, distribution, income, production
and pricing of goods and services are predominantly determined through the
operation of a free market." Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wikilcapitalism
(last visited Sept. 15, 2008) (citations omitted). When defining a "market"
economy, its definition distinguishes a "planned" economy and offers two
theoretical alternatives to a "capitalist" market economy-"laissez-faire" and
"anarcho-capitalism" while noting that all capitalist economies are "mixed"
economies. Id. Now, none of this is stupid, but the relative isomorphism
between capitalism and market economy called "mixed" indicates that little
analytic work is being done by these terms, but much ideological work. After
the collapse of the Iron Curtain, public discourse is still fighting battles against
socialism. This is not a serious activity.
13. David A. "Bert" Westbrook, Floyd H. & Hilda L. Hurst Faculty Scholar
and Professor, University at Buffalo Law School.
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hope to secure more value, but risk having less. Though the
point is clearer to most people if such hypothetical examples
use lenders of value, the crux of capitalism remains the
same. My piggy bank or a commercial bank are simply
different sources for the value that it is hoped I will be able
to transfer from now to some future time.14 Financings are
thus the mechanism that instantiates the abstract calculus
of risk and reward that is implicit in capitalist activity.
Now, I suppose that all of this went by a bit quickly so
let me recap. Markets always require that rules combine
with a form of economic life in which a significant number
of people will be willing to act within the set of rules
established. At the same time, the existence of a market
does not in and of itself imply the existence of a capitalist
economy, for capitalism requires the widespread use of
financings, the attempt to move value from one point in
time to another with the hope of earning more in the future
than one has in the present, but always with the risk that
one may earn less.
Start again with rules. That markets require rule systems
means that there is no such thing as a (rule-)free market. A
claim that one prefers the "free market" to a potential
regulatory regime is only shorthand for avoiding the task of
explaining why one particular rule system is preferable to
another, for all markets, and thus all capitalist economies,
are constructed. 15 Markets can be created, and so games
14. It is here important to note, but unessential to elaborate, that financings
may transfer future value to the present. Any stream of future periodic
payments has a present value and might be sold to another for the present
value of those payments. The recurrent ads for J. G. Wentworth, hawking "cash
now" for "your structured settlement" are a homey, if annoying, example of such
a financing. See http://www.jgwentworth.com (last visited Sept. 15, 2008).
15. My friend Jos6 M. Gabilando, Associate Professor of Law, Florida
International University, offers the following explanation of how he came to
understand this point.
One of the things I found most interesting about working in
Washington was learning how "engineered" markets and their
institutions were. I had a friend who was a senior official at the
International Monetary Fund. His job was to go around the world
designing central banks, currencies, and legal regimes, and getting
these markets off the ground. He once sent me an IMF working paper
on government securities markets. What struck me about the report
and, indeed, the IMF, was that market structure was something to be
"determined" or "invented" by some combination of fiat and negotiation
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can be played, under all manner of rule systems. Prices may
be established by law or not. Fraud may be prohibited or
not. Minimum capital requirements may be imposed or not.
Maximum, minimum, or uniform size of transactions may
be essential or not. Elaborate disclosure regimes for sellers
and/or buyers in a market might be legislated; instead, some
entity might be permitted to certify, and thus sometimes to
exclude, goods that may be traded in the market. Days and
times of operation might be set or not. Governments might
participate in markets or not. Under all or any combination
of these and dozens of other possible rules a market might
possibly be established. And thus, in any circumstance
where someone opposes or advocates a change in the
existing rule system, all that person is saying is that she or
he does or does not approve of the results that the present
rule system allows to take place in the market in question.
Because so many people have a difficult time
understanding this point, let me try it yet one more time.
The notion of the free market, a market free of the cost
imposed by government regulation, surely dates back to
Adam Smith, who knew first hand the cost of such
regulation in the British economy of his day. But, what he
and his followers saw as a preferred set of rules for their
economy has changed from being the slogan that captured
the set of reforms they championed to an ideal or ideal type
or ideology, and for perfectly understandable reasons. Soon
after the implementation of these reforms, the English
economy began an unbelievable expansion. Though causal
contribution is a tricky subject, the causal link was
customarily made and the free market ideal loosed on the
world. Later, those changes were seen to have entailed
effects with respect to poverty and worker exploitation that
the society was unwilling to endure. Further, changes were
with interest groups rather than "found" in nature. Why awareness of
this is not more widespread is that although we all play in these
games, the way in which the games are invented never comes into
view, except for those who make the games (and their knowing critics, I
guess). I came to appreciate how contingent, rather than natural,
market structure was because I observed all these people going about
their professional lives as though this were true. The IMF is a game-
maker of the first magnitude because it is the consummate repeat
player and its games are so hard to understand.
I wish I had had such a wondrous experience instead of figuring this point out
the hard way.
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made. These changes were again based on arguments about
what the preferred set of rules should be. However, the
ideal continued in pubic discourse. This thumbnail story
demonstrates that political dispute about economic matters
is always about figuring out what set of rules is appropriate
to a market or an entire economy. A market free of
governmental regulation will of course reduce the costs of
such regulation to zero with some gain to some people. And
probably some loss to others. The question that remains,
however, is not where the balance lies, though that is always
relevant, but how society wants an individual market or an
entire economy to work. This is never an easy question. It is
not made any easier by calls to arms on the side of less or
even more rules. The understanding of markets that I
advance here embodies an attempt to avoid such sloganeering.
Next, remember the existence of a rule system does not
in and of itself create a market. Rules may establish a game
that is so boring that no one will play. Likewise games can
be so rigged to favor one party-or the house-as to entice
few players. Thus, enough people need to be willing to show
up to act within the terms of that rule system, to trade
goods or money or promises for goods or money or promises,
to exchange one thing of value for another, for there to be a
market. Those people are willing to come because the
nature of the market established by the rule system at a
time and place allows them to believe that participating in
it is to their own advantage, that the potential reward is
worth the risk. Thus, markets have histories. Some are
effectively stillborn. Others, such as the great Champagne
fairs of the thirteenth century, grow, but eventually die.
Some die because trade routes or modes of transportation
change. The grain market in Buffalo is an example. Others
die because the economy changes in such a way that the
product traded is no longer needed and so not wanted. The
New Bedford market for whale oil died out as manufactured
gas became available for domestic lighting. This was long
before most whale species were dangerously depleted.
Nevertheless, the existence of markets in which there
are games that people are willing to play does not imply
capitalism. Capitalism requires financings-the attempted
transfer of value from one time period to another. 16 The
16. A word of clarification needs be inserted here as, despite my best efforts
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sellers of bread and ale at the Champagne fairs were not
participating in capitalism and not because they did not
wish to earn a profit. They probably profited handsomely.
Though the question of whether one is engaging in a
financing is always a slippery one, as the existence of a
market in "overnight funds" for bank members of the
Federal Reserve system ought to make clear, only in the
weakest sense were the activities of these provisioners an
example of a financing. The risk of using accumulated
capital to buy wheat, even a week's supply at fair time, to
make bread or even barley for beer a month ahead, was
quite limited, and risk is always implicit in a financing.
Had the baker borrowed money to buy wheat, or the
brewer, barley, the risk surely would be greater. But
however much greater, and thus on whatever side of an
invisible line denoting a financing we may put such a
borrowing, the risk was surely less than that of the
Venetian trader who went to the Levant to buy pepper and
spices, and having done so traveled to the fairs to sell these
goods or even to trade them for woolen and linen cloth.
Whatever his source of capital, he was engaging in a
financing and so was participating in capitalism, as of
course was the Venetian banker had the trader borrowed
the money to buy the pepper and spices in the first place.'
7
in this initial discussion, my text seems to have confused otherwise astute
readers. In order to be able to choose to play or to forego playing the games that
make up any particular capitalism, one needs either a personal source of value
that makes financings possible or the ability to secure that value from others.
Without a source of value one cannot play whatever game the rules may
structure. Thus, many will simply be unable to play or worse, as is the case
with most wage earners, find themselves trapped in a game that others play.
Such people will be swept along with whatever currents carry them in whatever
variety of capitalism their society has. They may profit or they may sink, but
they will never have the chance to play and so to be one of the masters of the
universe. Indeed, even the fact that one has access to a source of value does not
mean that one may not be trapped as a bystander, necessitous or not, in a game
others are playing. Here, consider my situation with respect to that large
portion of my wealth that is locked in my TIAA-CREF retirement account or the
situation of most of middle management in any large American corporation.
17. Betty (Elizabeth) Mensch, Distinguished Teaching Professor, University
at Buffalo Law School, notes that the medieval Church's prohibition of usury
makes it quite obvious that financings were common even earlier than the
thirteenth century. Indeed, various sees, abbeys, congregations, and other
religious bodies actively lent money to finance local royal courts.
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These are the Venetian dance steps to the ballet of risk and
reward that is endlessly replayed in any capitalism.' 8
I am sure that this stripped down definition of
capitalism-rules + players + financings-will meet with
less than universal applause. It is regularly suggested that
capitalism requires some or all of private property, freedom
of contract, the price system, and the rule of law. On and on
the list extends. The difficulty with all of these additions is
that they tend to load the answers given to questions about
capitalism in ideologically suspect ways. Take private
property. The most important question with respect to
private property is: "How much?" Even in Russia in the
Thirties, the existence of the crime of theft of state property
suggests that there was some property that was not state
property. What else could it have been than some species of
private property? So, if one needs to get out beyond the
Stalinist terror to find the absence of private property, one is
pretty far into the dystopian literature. Similar observations
are possible with respect to freedom of contract. The
relevant question is: "To what extent are contracts
enforceable?" That they might be reviewable for fairness
may suggest that the range of bargain may be narrower,
and so possible transactions more limited, than would be
the case were they not subject to such review, but that fact
does not limit freedom within some zone of fairness.
Consider next the price system. Here too, this is a
matter of more or less. At some point administered prices
and quality control might be so total as to make plausible
the assertion that no markets exist in a society. However,
18. Steve Marshall objects that the example of the Champagne fairs is not
clear enough to make my point about capitalism and financings. I confess to a
certain perverseness in my choice of an example here, derived as it is from my
love of Fernand Braudel's description of the fairs in 3 THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE
WORLD, CIVILIZATION AND CAPITALISM: 15TH TO 18TH CENTURY (Sifin Reynolds
trans., 1984). The question of when capitalism emerged is a controversial one,
probably unnecessarily so. At the margin, financings are always matters of
more or less, and so capitalism in such circumstances is always more or less. In
Champagne, bread and beer were probably subject to a fair price regime and so
are an example of local cartel behavior. Pepper, spice, and cloth probably were
not so subject. This difference makes a big difference in risk, for me enough to
turn a difference in degree to a difference in kind. Others may argue to the
contrary. However, I doubt whether anything turns on this question of where
the line is drawn.
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short of that extreme, some markets will exist even if
competition is only over quality, as surely was the case at
the Champagne fairs and in all sorts of circumstances
where market conduct was governed by fair price regimes.
Of course, a price may be set so low and black markets
suppressed so effectively that no goods are produced for
sale. Still, all of these possibilities are part of a multi-
dimensional field that may turn out to be sufficient for the
development of an active market that will bring forward
financings, and so capitalism. As for the rule of law-the
notion of reasonable administrative regularity-that state
of affairs is obviously also a matter of degree, as ought to be
clear from the willingness of major international corporations
to invest in regimes with quite shaky administrative
apparatuses, not to mention the occasional scandals about
their failure to comply with the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.
Taken as a whole, what makes this entire list of the
necessary conditions to the existence of capitalism fascinating
is the degree to which it conflates the idea of a market with
particular visions of what capitalism must be-of the
ideologies of capitalism. Markets require remarkably little
to begin to function. My favorite story in this respect is one
told by Norville Morris when I was in law school. He
recounted that he was an officer in the European theater
during World War II, and accompanied the advance troops
of the British forces on the first day the Western Allies
reached Berlin. Driving through that city on the second day,
Morris was hailed by someone selling a newspaper and
purchased it with the local currency--cigarettes. The
newspaper had a classified ad in it offering canned peaches
for sale at a given address. Getting out a Berlin street map
that he had been supplied with, Morris directed his driver
to the location where he believed the address would have
been had the area not been bombed out. There he found a
gentleman who had cans of peaches lined up on a scrap of
board stretched between piles of rubble. The price, again in
the local currency, was neatly lettered on a sign. Morris
bought some. There was neither an official currency nor a
court system to enforce contracts. The only rule of law was
the gun. Morris respected private property, though it was
not clear how many hungry people in the city would do so
as well, and so paid the indicated price.
Had Morris discovered an example of capitalism in
action? I rather doubt it. Clearly no financings were going on.
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But this was equally clearly an example of a rudimentary
market. This distance from capitalism is important to note,
for capitalism will not arise in just any market. Measures, if
only implicit, of the balance between risk and reward take
into consideration the structure of the market in question
that include questions about property, contract price, and
administrative regularity. At some point, for some persons,
with some resource endowments, that balance will become
positive and financings will be undertaken.
At the same time, it is important to remember that the
existence of a functioning market here and another there
with financings taking place whenever, may be evidence of
capitalism, but no more than that-evidence. As Charles E.
Lindblom makes clear, for a functioning capitalism,
markets of many kinds need to be braided together,
turned into a market system 19 or what I sometimes call an
economy--"a persistent market structure" that fuses "an
understanding of economic life with the patterns of behavior
within the economic, political, and social institutions that
enact that understanding.' '20  The differences between
persistent market structures or market systems define
different economies, the varieties of capitalism that are the
subject of this somewhat over-extended essay. 21
19. CHARLES E. LINDBLOM, THE MARKET SYSTEM: WHAT IT Is, How IT WORKS,
AND WHAT TO MAKE OF IT 4 (2001).
20. John Henry Schlegel, Law and Economic Change During the Short
Twentieth Century, in 3 THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF LAW IN AMERICA 563, 564
(Michael Grossberg & Christopher Tomlins eds., 2008).
21. Despite all that Lindblom's work has done to inform my thinking about
economic life, I confess that from the beginning I have been uncomfortable with
the "system" part of the "market system." For me, that word denotes relatively
more than less order, even the possibility that within the system equilibrium will
be reached. I prefer "structure," for structures may be more or less ordered, even
amorphous, and many will never reach anything like equilibrium. For some
readers, "structure" alone implies that the character of the whole influences that
of the parts, an aspect of any set of social practices that I believe is important to
understand in this context, whichever word is chosen. Moreover, I find that it is
too easy for readers to slip from the market system to capitalism, as if that were a
unitary phenomenon, not that Lindblom believes it to be such. I am quick to
acknowledge the confusion that may result from my rejecting his more careful
language, and instead speak of market structure meaning either or both the
structure of a single market or of the web of markets that makes up an economy
or variety of capitalism. Unfortunately, most of any author's writing is limited to
what fits comfortably on that writer's tongue. "Structure" fits better on mine,
though in this piece I have used the words together when their meanings overlap.
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It is in this and only this sense that the overall structure
or system of markets-what the rules are and so whether
under these rules players will participate in financings--can
be said to be properly conflated, not with a unitary
capitalism, but with particular varieties of capitalism. Thus,
if one wants more of a particular variety of capitalist activity
or even a different variety of capitalism altogether, one
alters the structure or system of markets that one has; if one
wants less of a particular variety, one likewise alters the
structure or system of markets that one has. In either case
one is always hoping that the alteration will have the
intended effect, while knowing from experience that, at best,
one is likely to get but a distant cousin of that intent. As my
friend Ken Davidson is wont to say: "In economics, intent
has a nasty way of not controlling outcomes. ' 22
With this all clear, at least to me, it is possible to turn
to various articulations of possible varieties of capitalism.
Here I wish to start with one of the oldest of them-the
Marxian tripartite division of capitalism into commercial,
industrial, and financial. While there are hints of this
tripartite division in Marx's great corpus, the first full
explication of financial capitalism is by Rudolph Hilferding
in a book called Finance Capital, published in 1910,23 that
provoked an expansion and critique by Karl Kautsky in
1911.24 Thereafter, in the words of my friend Karl KIare:
"Each of the three categories went through successive
revisions, mutations, critiques, and reassessments by
subsequent generations of Marxists, neo-Marxists, and post-
Marxists. ' 25 The details of this later history are not
important for present purposes.
22. Kenneth M. Davidson was once a faculty member at UB Law, spent
many years at the Federal Trade Commission, and having retired from that job,
has a small consulting business. See http://kennethdavidson.com.
23. RUDOLF HILFERDING, FINANCE CAPITAL: A STUDY OF THE LATEST PHASE OF
CAPITALIST DEVELOPMENT (Tom Bottomore ed., Morris Watnick & Sam Gordon
trans., 1981) (1910).
24. Karl Kautsky, Finance-Capital and Crises, 15 SOCIAL DEMOCRAT 326
(July-Dec. 1911).
25. Karl E. Klare is the George J. & Kathleen Waters Matthews
Distinguished University Professor at Northeastern University School of Law.
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One can see some sense to the progression of economies
from commercial to industrial to financial. Trading cultures
antedate all but the tiniest workshops, and while bankers
appear before large workshops, not to mention the modern
industrial factory, the development of modern investment
houses mostly follows the development of the early forms of
the industrial corporation. Coincident with this historical
pattern is the structural one in which trade allows the
accumulation of capital that can be invested in industrial
enterprises whose growth by the accumulation of capital
allows investors to do their own capital accumulation. For
these reasons, the historian in me has always been partial
to this tripartite division, despite the fact that I could never
accept the labor theory of value on the basis of which Marx
began to understand the sequence. However, there are
certain problems with the sequence and thus the division.
Consider the American economy for which the notion
that the commercial capitalism of New England traders
preceded the industrial capitalism of large Mid-Atlantic and
Mid-Western manufacturers that was followed by the great
Wall Street bankers of the Gilded Age makes a certain
amount of sense. How much is the question. The initial
difficulty with this sequence is that the final form-
financial capitalism-is a "stutter," unless it is understood
that the adjective qualifying the noun "capitalism" in this
case is there for academic symmetry since capitalism is
defined by financings. However, the more significant
difficulty is that this abstract historical sequence implies a
concrete progression from the trader Marshall Field to the
manufacturer Andrew Carnegie to the banker J.P. Morgan.
Such a procession is difficult to support given that these
men were contemporaries, just as were Venetian traders,
workshop owners, and bankers.
Today, one might identify Sam Walton as the classic
contemporary version of Field, Bill Gates or Steve Jobs as
perfectly good versions of Carnegie, and Robert Rubin or
Henry Paulson as, if not Morgan, then the banker/Treasury
Secretary, Andrew Mellon. It thus would be more plausible
to suggest that at most times all three species of capitalism
have co-existed, perhaps even before the thirteenth century,
and so that dominance is a relative matter. Thus
understood, each species description would be seen not to
identify a particular point in a historical sequence, but
rather the dominant form of activity of the capitalists
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assembled at a particular time and place. Such an
understanding is already a good distance from the Marxian
one, based as it is in labor theory and the expropriation of
surplus value from labor.
A still more significant difficulty, however, is that, if
the defining characteristic of capitalism is financing, then
while the focus on change over time in what is to be
financed is intuitively sensible, it is difficult to defend
analytically given the temporal co-existence of forms. The
questions of risk and reward that at any point in time drive
a financing derive from the structure of the relevant market
and the other opportunities available in the overall
economy. It is underlying questions such as these that will
tend to direct financings into one or another sector of the
economy, only one of which is the nature of that sector.
Indeed, it seems to me that it is no more sensible to
postulate sectoral differences as the root of the various
species of capitalism than it would be to postulate
organizational differences in the sources of capital-family
capitalism, partnership capitalism, corporate capitalism-
as the root of capitalism's species. Each misses the fact that
for capital, both sectoral and organizational questions are
always present and need to be accounted for when engaging
in any financing. They are part of an estimate of risk and
reward, but are surely no more important than questions of
overall market structure or system that always need to be
accounted for as well. Indeed, given that both sectoral and
organizational alternatives are largely uniform over many
types of overall market structure or system, it is at least
arguable that, as I have asserted above, concerns related to
overall market structure or system are dominant when
distinguishing species of capitalism.
This is not to say that sectoral considerations are
irrelevant to understanding changes in capitalism over
periods of time or even at a given point of time. The
Marxian categories remain very useful for diagnosing what
is going on in an economy, for example, the current much
ballyhooed, and so over-hyped shift from manufacturing to
service in the American economy. And, if one were to rescue
agriculture from the obscure debates over primitive
capitalist accumulation, Marxian sectoral analysis would be
even more helpful. However, standing alone, this analysis is
not likely to differentiate species of capitalism. Other
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considerations need to be taken into account. I will examine
a work that looks at some of these considerations, next.
Robert Reich attempts to combine sectoral considerations
with organizational ones when offering an historical account
of the post-war American economy. He distinguishes
between the "democratic capitalism" of the Fifties and
Sixties and the "supercapitalism" of today.26 The democratic
part of the distinction flags Reich's real interest, redressing
democratic deficits in American political economy today, but,
this matter aside, the distinction makes a certain amount of
historical sense. However, his focus on oligopolies in
manufacturing and their decline discloses other problems.
For Reich, democratic capitalism was the result of "a
complex and continuous set of negotiations" between
oligopolistic industry groups, unionized labor, and
government that took advantage of the "large economies of
scale" in industrial plants designed for "high productivity. ' 27
Such plants supplied "tens of millions of steady jobs" while
generating "significant profits" that executives, acting as"corporate statesman," widely distributed "downward to
blue-collar workers and outward to smaller communities,
farmers, and other constituents. '28 All of the beneficiaries of
this statesmen-like conduct comprised the "millions of
consumers who used this largesse to purchase the goods
and services produced in ever larger quantities, thereby
stabilizing the economy for large-scale production. The
result was a large and growing middle class .... ,,29
Unfortunately, Reich cannot give an equally clear
account of supercapitalism, for it is essentially a negation of
what came before it. For him, "emerging technologies," such
as containerized shipping and computers, "allowed the
creation of global supply chains" that facilitated the
production of goods "at low cost without large scale" and the
distribution of "services over the Internet," all of which"shattered the old system of large-scale production and
26. REICH, supra note 9, at 13-14.
27. Id. at 47.
28. Id. at 47-48.
29. Id. at 47.
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dramatically increased competition."30 Simultaneously,
large retailers were able "to aggregate consumer buying
power and push companies . . . harder for bargains," while
financial firms similarly helped "investors to put their
savings into" investment vehicles that "pressured
companies for higher returns."31 As a result, "intensifying
competition ... put pressure on companies to cut payrolls,
hitting unionized workers especially hard" and "corporate
statesmen lost whatever capacity they had to weigh the
interests of their communities and employees. '32
I cannot object to the general outlines of this story.
After all, about ten years ago I authored a similar outline of
this period of American economic history that has now
appeared in print.33 I called the Fifties economy
"Associationalist"34 and the Nineties, "Impatient.' ' 35 Mine
was a descriptive enterprise and lacked the focus on
democracy that drives Reich's analysis. Thus, for the most
part, I eschewed a causal analysis. Reich claims to do so as
well, though the technological determinism that he
nominally rejects seems, to me at least, to permeate the
way he chronicles this transformation.
One might subdue technological determinism were
Reich to offer a strong explanation for the drive for lower
prices and higher returns on the part of American
consumers and investors. As it is, all that supports this
drive are background assumptions about homo economus
and a capitalism relentlessly searching for profits, a
somewhat surprising picture for a writer concerned about
democracy. Such an analysis is implausible and
unfortunate. No capitalist wants to be caught in a perfectly
competitive market. Living in a world where marginal cost,
including the marginal cost of capital, equals marginal
revenue is very, very scary. When patent protected or
resource-based monopolies are not possible routes for
avoiding competition, oligopoly is the preferred fall back.
30. Id. at 86-87.
31. Id. at 87.
32. Id. at 86-87.
33. Schlegel, supra note 20.
34. Id. at 571.
35. Id. at 586.
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Product differentiation through branding, and defensively
through line extension, comes in a weak, though today a
common, third. Competition is a feared "also ran."
Something on the demand side has made it
unfortunately important for capitalists today to court living
on the marginal cost knife-edge. My suspicion is that, in the
late Sixties and Seventies, as productivity declined and
inflation picked up, the newly expanded middle class, and
especially its children, found that it was increasingly
difficult to live as well as their parents had. They also
learned that moving up the social ladder required an
expensive education for their children and a long time
horizon. In such circumstances, circumstances that I know
from being there, specialty retailers such as Pier 1-how
exciting was my first visit to one in San Francisco in 1968-
and auto makers such as Toyota, that imported relatively
inexpensive, good quality merchandise, helped to stretch
budgets. In so doing, they added just enough pressure on
oligopolistic competitors to create cost-cutting as a plausible
response and so to fracture the cozy old-time oligopolistic
structure that protected both local retailers and Detroit's
Big Three automakers.
Such an explanation does not, however, deal with the
fact that Reich, for all of his interest in the structure of
politics and his largely structural understanding of what
makes for democratic capitalism, is both rather thin on the
details of his economic structure and even thinner on his
capitalism. From his story, one would think that economies
were never before upset by changes in technologies of
transportation, as if the clipper ship, then the railroad, and
finally the steamship, did not reduce the cost of freight
significantly enough to make the transport of some goods
over a long distance notably less expensive and so to make
those goods newly available in distant, previously protected
markets. It is just possible that containerization is more
symbol than cause of a shift in economic structure.
Arguably, the prosperous democratic capitalism of the
Fifties was dependent on the United States being, effectively,
an economic island for the years that encompass the time it
took for the European and Japanese economies to recover
from the economic devastation of World War II. At the
least, it surely is an interesting coincidence that just as
these economies began to hit stride with the production of
goods from their manufacturing facilities outfitted with the
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newest processes, the old American oligopolies began to
crumble, aided, of course, by Lyndon Johnson's guns and
butter policy during his part of the Vietnam War, a policy
designed in part to extend the good times of the Fifties a
few more years at the cost of tolerating a certain amount of
inflation.
Equally troubling is the curious late appearance of
capitalism as financings in Reich's story. It is not surprising
that a partisan of organized labor should focus on
manufacturing in a story of the past sixty years, yet even
manufacturing requires financings. There were two great
financial oligopolies in the Fifties economy. One,
commercial banking, was heavily regulated and supplied
almost all of the short term capital that manufacturers
needed; the other, investment banking, separated by law
from commercial banking, handled long term financing-
both debt and equity. Both were white-shoe, relationship-
driven enterprises, sleepy but lucrative, just like the elite
practice of law in these years.
However, it was not only regulation that kept
financings simple. It is important to remember that at this
time modern portfolio theory was largely unknown. This
theory was developed as a result of the effort, funded by the
Ford Foundation, to increase the quality, seemingly
understood as rigor, of management school education. Math
was seen as rigorous, more rigorous than the other parts of
a business school education. Whatever one may think about
portfolio theory as a representation of the world, and I for
one think that the assumption of normal distribution of
events, while mathematically understandable, is pretty
lame, it made newly thinkable all sorts of financial
engineering that were unimaginable before. Give toys to
boys and they will play, as we have learned recently to our
collective displeasure.
What do these defects, if they are such rather than
simply omissions, in Reich's understanding of our two
economies, one of recent memory and the other of present
unhappiness, suggest? Just this, I think. First, to understand
any species of capitalism one needs to pay attention to overall
economic structure or system in more than a local sense
and in a deeper way than it is explicated in the economic
press. People's homes and fears as well as their knowledge
base are a significant part of any understanding of an
economy. Second, an island economy is an anomaly in the
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sweep of recent economic history. A case made on the basis
of such an economy needs be treated cautiously. And, third,
it is probably better to look across countries when trying to
identify constant structures or systems of capitalism,
because without comparison the peculiarities of one nation's
economic history may be taken to account for too much of
what should be told as part of a more general story.
These last two points are addressed by the work of Hall
and Soskice. Their distinction between coordinated market
economies and liberal market economies neatly parallels
Reich's distinction between democratic capitalism and
supercapitalism. However, by looking at many economies in
both Europe and North American during the same, late
twentieth century time period, they avoid the problems of
both economic islands and singular case studies. Having
taken care of these problems, however, another appears.
Hall and Soskice begin by developing a typology that
follows from their assumption that the firm in a capitalist
economy depends on its "capacities for developing,
producing, and distributing goods and services profitably"
and so must address "coordination problems," "both
internally, with its own employees, and externally, with a
range of other actors that include suppliers, clients,
collaborators, stakeholders, trade unions, business
associations, and governments. ' 36 From these premises they
proceed to examine five spheres of coordination-industrial
relations, vocational training and education, corporate
governance, inter-firm relations, and employees.37 For their
examination they use data relevant to these spheres,
covering the period between 1950 and 2000 from various
groupings of nineteen, mostly North Atlantic countries,
though focusing on Germany and the United States. Then
they distinguish groups of countries with similar economic
structures or systems, developing two ideal types-"liberal
market economies" where "firms coordinate their activities
primarily via hierarchies and competitive market
arrangements" and "coordinated market economies" where
"firms depend more heavily on non-market relationships to
36. See Hall & Soskice, supra note 10, at 6.
37. Id. at 7.
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coordinate their endeavors with other actors."38 Anglo-
American countries influenced by the common law comprise
the first group and continental European civil law
countries, the second, though interestingly remarkably
little is made of this legal difference.
Given all of the support that Hall and Soskice adduce
across countries and continents for their identification of
these two varieties of capitalism, I am convinced that their
distinction has been soundly established. Some might object
that it cannot be the case that Reich is correct that the
United States morphed from being, in Hall and Soskice's
language, a coordinated market economy to a liberal
market economy and that those two gentlemen are correct
in seeing both forms as coexisting in the same period.
However, I am not particularly bothered by this objection.
Indeed, Hall and Soskice readily admit that their ideal
types are merely end points on a continuum. After all, it is
not like the American economy is not regulated in the
interest of securing cooperation with governmental
priorities. Americans simply prefer carrots to sticks, as any
close perusal of the history of federal income taxation would
make clear. Nor are social supports for old age, infirmity,
even unemployment altogether lacking in this country, not
to mention all of the social services that supply employment
to legions of college graduates. And it is not like German
firms abjure contractual or hierarchical relations.
A more difficult problem, however, follows from the
concession that the ideal types are merely end points on a
continuum. Is there then any reason to believe that these
are separable species rather than modest differentiations
within the category of the regulated economy from my
college course in economics? A case for species differentiation
would have to be made beyond that of the ability to isolate
ideal types. Chemistry roots the differentiations that
comprise the elements of the periodic table in atomic
structure. Geology, rock types in the three basic processes
for their creation and the idea of successive deposition.
Botany, speciation in the morphology of plants, particularly
their methods and structures of reproduction. Zoology is
much the same in its focus on morphology and reproduction.
What social, structural, and/or political factors might
38. Id. at 8.
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account for Hall and Soskice's differentiated species? What
might play the same role that technology plays for Reich in
explaining his historical discontinuity of forms?
Looked at dispassionately, I rather doubt that Hall and
Soskice have an account for the differentiation of the
species of capitalism, though their use of Douglas North's
understanding of "institutions" obscures this absence. 39
North understood that "the market," the timeless, spaceless
entity beloved by economists, does not provide a sufficient
context for describing economic life. He therefore argued
that the market was not a faceless plain, but rather that it
was a terrain delineated, given features, by its
institutions.40 This is an interesting idea and North is
justifiably famous for it. Except that the word he chose for
those features, "institutions," has been used by him and
others to mean quite a grab bag of things.
An example of the grab bag can be found in Hall and
Soskice's text. They say, "Following North .. .we define
institutions as a set of rules, formal or informal, that actors
generally follow, whether for normative, cognitive, or
material reasons, and organizations as durable entities with
formally recognized members, whose rules also contribute
to the institutions of the political economy."'41 Then they
note "markets are institutions that support relationships of
particular types, marked by arm's-length relations and high
levels of competition."42 After next recognizing that
hierarchies are also part of a firm's economic activity in
liberal market economies, they try to identify the
"distinctive" "types of organizations and institutions [that]
support the distinctive strategies of economic actors" in
coordinated market economies. 43 They conclude, "[t]ypically,
these institutions include powerful business or employer
associations, strong trade unions, extensive networks of
cross-shareholding, and legal or regulatory systems designed
39. See Hall & Soskice, supra note 10, at 9.
40. DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE (1990).





to facilitate information-sharing and collaboration." 44 They
thus put forth as "institutions" a mixture of formal rules-
"legal or regulatory systems," organizations--"business or
employer organization" and "trade unions," and possibly
informal rules-"networks of cross-shareholding,"45 although
perhaps not, for when they get to discussing informal rules,
cross share-holding is not mentioned; instead, history and
culture are identified as molding institutions.
Now none of this confusion should cause one to reject
Hall and Soskice's observations out of hand.46 Still, it
suggests the difficulties that accompany any scholar's
appeal to institutional forms as part of structural or
systemic differentiations, difficulties that might be
understood as threefold, all of which are rolled together in
Hall and Soskice's single sentence expressing their
allegiance to North's work. First, drawing on a confused
early twentieth century economics literature, "institutions"-
textualized understandings of normative regimes-has been
used to describe bodies of legal doctrine-contracts,
property, anti-trust, etc.-and political concepts-the rule
of law. This is North's most narrow construction of the term
and, unfortunately, his most counter-intuitive use because
such rule systems are difficult to separate from the people
who do things in their name-lawyers, judges, title
examiners, zoning commissioners-and so both instantiate,
and beg, the ancient question about separating the dancer
from the dance. 47 Is the institution the system of rules, or
44. Id. at 10.
45. Id.
46. Though, as Bert Westbrook has suggested, it does seem to render the
argument tautological. Is it true that the market, an aspect of society, is defined
by its institutions, the forms of that society? Yes, always.
47. It has been suggested to me that this reference to William Butler Yeats,
Among Schoolchildren, in THE COMPLETE POEMS OF W.B. YEATS 215, 217
(Richard J. Finneran ed., rev. 2d ed., Scribner Paperback Poetry 1996) (1983) is
less helpful than I think it might be. The relevant passage at the end of that
poem
O chestnut tree, great rooted blossomer,
Are you the leaf, the blossom or the bole?
O body swayed to music, 0 brightening glance,
How can we know the dancer from the dance?
makes clear, to me at least, that often a separation of parts from wholes is
impossible and so it is foolish of thinkers such as Plato or Aristotle or
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the humans' actions, or can one not be described without
the other? Second, there are the institutions formally
organized as such-investment banks, commercial banks,
mutual funds, lobbying groups, the New York Stock
Exchange, the Securities and Exchange Commission-that
Hall and Soskice sometimes, but not always, refer to as
organizations. Here the dancer and dance problem gets
transmuted into principal and agent, but at least the
institutions have a vaguely corporeal feel. And third, there
are the metaphorical institutions such as the stock market,
a non-place where institutions in the second sense and their
constitutive real people-though mostly as agents, not
principals-engage in economic activity that is informed by
institutions in the first sense, and their equally real
people. 48 Here, however, it is important to remember that
institutions in this third sense play out as patterns of
repetitive, expected, and so institutional, behavior that is
somehow distinct from the behaviors described by either
the first sense or the second sense, but that nevertheless
from time to time includes them. This is not a clean theory
or even a particularly coherent description.
It strikes me as unfortunate that in the world's largest
language we cannot find different words for these three
groups of things we call institutions. If all three groups
deserve the same name, it is because each combines a rule
system, more or less formal and explicit, with the actions of
humans, more or less interlaced with that rule system in
such a way that to pull apart the rule system and the
actions of humans is an interesting exercise, but one that
should be engaged in cautiously, not reflexively. Seen this
way, it is implausible to treat "property" as an institution.
It is no more plausible to treat "contract," or competition
law-the system that might be designed "to facilitate
information-sharing and collaboration,"-or "the rule of
law" as institutions either. Each is a rule system whose
instantiation requires the actions of countless people within
and without bureaucratic entities of various sizes. These
Pythagoras, all mentioned earlier in the poem, to try to make such separations.
This too is true of law and economy. The academic intellectual enterprise is
possible, but highly artificial. Yeats's image of wholeness is, of course, what the
poet and the essayist, including this one, try to convey, but never fully succeed
in doing.
48. Jos6 Gabilondo helped me with this set of definitions.
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entities are in turn marked by express rules, only some of
which are formally adopted as law, and implicit rules that
are routine ways of doing, or even thinking, about things.
Thus, the first group of institutions, the textual ones, taken
together can be seen as coextensive with the second group
of institutions, the formal ones, taken together,49 the
difference being that the first are grouped by legal category
and the second by bureaucratic entities. In this way the
institution of "property" covers steel mills and a steel
manufacturer's association, and a steel mill and a steel
manufacturer's association participate in property, though
in different ways. And then the third group of institutions,
the metaphorical ones, is distinguished from the second in
that they are not formal bureaucratic entities, though we
treat them as if they were.
Now it would be foolish of me to believe that I could
force a disentanglement of these three aspects of"institution" by proposing separable names for each.
Indeed, it would be a waste of time trying any harder than I
have, for I doubt that the distinctions are all that
important. Thus, I hope that I can be forgiven for not taking
the category "institutions" seriously. Property and contract
and the rule of law are not institutions in any plausible
sense. Similarly the SEC and the stock market are not
different kinds of institutions in any but a formally legal
sense. Here, law confuses people's thinking by separating
rule systems, as well as bureaucratic entities, from the
actions of the people that instantiate them. Each of these
academic abstractions can be understood as simplifying
inquiries by narrowing them in the interest of making the
narrowed fields of inquiry separable and special, and so of
crucial importance for the human understanding of social
life. Such episodes of intellectual, insecure self-centeredness
are understandable, but not therefore helpful to thought.
That said, it is likewise important to understand that
North's, and derivatively Hall and Soskice's, emphasis on
institutions as crucial determinants of markets is generally
consistent with the understanding of markets as a
combination of rules and willing participants set forth at
the outset. Markets are not faceless plains. They are
created by humans for humans and so institutions in all
49. Or at the very least a large sub-set of them.
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three senses of this protean term. There are differences
between these two ways of seeing markets, however. Most
obvious ought to be that "institutions" suggests things that,
like ancient trees, are just there. The word thus implies less
of a role for state intervention, indeed less of a sense of
human intentionality, even intentionality that goes awry,
as most often it does, than does the notion of structures.
This difference is important. It is a canard of the Party
of the Right that markets are just there, that they are free
and just need to be left alone to do their work. "Institution"
is too close to this canard for my taste. Institutions may be
in the background of economic life. They may arise
mysteriously and do their work silently. They do not
therefore need to be left alone to work as they please. Their
work can and will be altered by human intervention. The
alteration may be no more than a random reaction to a
current unpleasant situation, the efficacy of which is
limited. Perversely, the alteration may even make the
situation worse. Still, that alteration-said to be an
intervention in the (free) market-will not result in the loss
of that fabled benefit, the obvious good called "efficiency."
To understand why this is so, one needs to be reminded
again that markets are not natural objects endowed with an
a priori set of properties that are themselves perfect, any
deviation from which brings a decrease in "efficiency." Just
as there is no hypothetically free market because all
markets are structured by rules and embodied in the
activities of people with various capacities and
endowments, there is no hypothetically efficient market.
Efficiency is whatever happens in a market at equilibrium
given the structure of that market and the resource
endowments that the participants in that market bring to
it. 50 Change the structure-or the endowments-and the
equilibrium will change, but the solution will still be the
efficient one. So, if one does not like the results of market
activity at equilibrium, then one can change either or both
the structure or endowments, and if one is lucky-after all,
people may simply refuse to participate in the market-the
50. I first came to understand this point in a conversation with Duncan
Kennedy, Carter Professor of General Jurisprudence at Harvard Law School,
many years ago. I believe he said it first. I suspect that he agrees.
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change will bring results at equilibrium closer to something
one likes better. Thus, the assertion that introducing or
expanding regulation in a market will decrease, or reducing
regulation will increase, the efficiency of a market is simply
the expression of a preference for one result at equilibrium
as against another and should be discussed in those terms,
not in terms of some hypothetical or phantom state of
affairs, the allegedly free market.
As was the case with my critique of the notion of a "free
market" made earlier, so many people have a difficult time
understanding the limits of the notion of "efficiency" that I
will try it one more time. In public discussion, "efficiency"
has come to mean something like lowest cost or lowest cost
per unit of production. Such is but one possible meaning of
the word. I have been told that somewhere out in
Scholarshipland there is an article documenting over twenty
meanings for the word. All of these meanings are attempts
to avoid the problem with the idea of efficiency that derives
from the fact that there is no natural state of affairs called
the market, free or otherwise, against which to determine
efficiency. This is because markets are not natural things,
unless one wishes to treat humans as part of nature. 51 The
notion of efficiency, just like that of the free market,
assumes a distinction between man and nature. Thus, all
understandings of efficiency are subject to contentious
arguments about what is meant by cost-marginal cost, fully
distributed cost, fully distributed cost accounting for all
externalities, fully distributed costs accounting for all
externalities, but assuming that all possible cost-reducing
transactions will be undertaken, fully distributed cost
assuming that only the most plausible cost reducing
transactions will be undertaken.5 2 The easiest way out of
51. This is a proposition that I heartily endorse. However, it is one that will
destroy the underpinnings of both modern environmental science and law, built
as they are on the distinction between man and nature, and so should be
adopted only with caution. With respect to efficiency, accepting man as part of
nature would mean that any change in the rules of the market by humans
would be natural and so efficient. The text above presents a less radical
alternative.
52. There is a technical literature about these possibilities that revolves
around the notions of Pareto efficiency, Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, Bayesian
efficiency, and various criticisms and purported improvements in each. This
discussion does not solve the problems adverted to in the text. It only attempts
to avoid them more elegantly.
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this mess is to abandon the attempt as unworkable and
recognize that markets always struggle towards the efficient
solution in the state of affairs in which they find themselves.
My usage attempts to make this recognition easier.
At this point, good friends regularly object that surely I
am wrong. More goods and services, especially if delivered
at a lower cost, are a good thing. Prices need to be paid
attention to, as well as who sets them, for price sends
important signals to both consumers and producers about
the use or consumption of scarce resources. I must confess
that I am not at all sure that more is always an unalloyed
good and I know that lower price is clearly not always good,
as administered prices of staples have caused serious
problems for fiscal stability in many countries. Moreover,
price, something that is seldom uniform because markets
seldom reach equilibrium, is at best a dubious measure of
value. It is most often so influenced by transaction costs,
especially the costs of transportation and information, not
to mention market structure, as to be a weak signal at best.
However, all of these concerns are besides my point.
"Efficiency," as used commonly, means "good" and so its
use hides questions of good and bad-of whether more or
lower price is always a good thing or what actual
transaction costs and market structures are doing to the
pricing mechanism in place. Linguistically, because
efficiency means good, it turns "legal regulation" into
meaning "bad." This is a bizarre, but politically potent,
result, given that legal regulation is ubiquitous because all
markets, as well as the entire market structure or system,
are constituted by rules. Thus, the important question is
what set of rules does a society want for this or that
market, or for the structure or system as a whole. My usage
then is designed to preserve, indeed to foreground questions
of good or bad that might otherwise be suppressed, and I
defend it as such.
Equally troubling as the implicit impression that
institutions are natural things whose operation can reach
some hypothetical efficiency is an absence that accompanies
the notion of markets as constituted by institutions-people
living in an existing economy. Just as North's notion of
institution allows elision of the active work of humans in
structuring markets, so too it assumes that economic actors
are faceless, unknowable creatures of whom it might be
said, "If you build it, they will come." Precisely the opposite
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is the case. Not only may no one come, but also who comes,
if at all, and with what resource endowments, is both
determinable in practice and different for different markets,
or the same markets in differing economies, or the same
economy at differing times. And who comes will make a
difference in outcomes at equilibrium.
A market with many, many small participants-the
market envisioned under the notion of "perfect"
competition-will operate differently from a market with
only a few large participants who have fairly good ideas of
each other's positions in the market and so the ability to"pile on" when one participant has a concentrated losing
position, as well as implicitly to agree to not make waves in
such situations-the oligopolistic competition that Hall and
Soskice call coordinated market economies and Reich calls
democratic capitalism. And both will operate differently
from a market with players of different sizes and resource
endowments. These are some of the real world
permutations that the game theoreticians might attempt to
model for their own purposes, though again the math may
be too complicated.
All this said, let me reiterate something. The analytic
deficiencies in the notion of an institution do not therefore
make it, and any work that relies on it, impossible of
rendering insights into capitalism any more than the
deficiencies in the Marxian scholars' analysis of three
capitalisms or Reich's implicit technological determinism
render these analyses worthless. Trading in goods is a
different activity that implies different financial concerns,
and so different financings, than manufacturing goods, and
financing either, or financing financings, implies yet a third
set of considerations. Sectors matter. Technology does make
some things possible that were not before. The extent of
collaboration between competitors is very important for how
markets operate, as Adam Smith observed many years ago.
Thus, it is important to understand that sectoral differences
and technological possibilities and competitor collaboration
all are important to take into account when trying to
understand how an economy operates. At some level at
least, all are likely to be associated with institutional, or as
I put it, structural, or as Lindblom would have it, systemic,
differences. Similarly, institutional or structural or
systemic differences, at some level at least, are likely to be
associated with economic outcomes. And so I turn next to
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another analysis that purports to recognize the importance
of institutions for understanding the varieties of capitalism.
Baumol and his associates begin with the assertion that
as an empirical matter there are four species of capitalism
alive and well in the world: state-guided capitalism, oligarchic
capitalism, big-firm capitalism, and entrepreneurial
capitalism.5 3 Set aside for the moment the question of what
might be the distinguishing characteristics of each of these
species. Instead, note that the first two species of
capitalism-state-guided and oligarchic-are the bad
capitalisms of their title, though the oligarchic form is clearly
the worst, and the second two-big-firm and entrepreneurial-
are the good capitalisms, though the entrepreneurial form is
clearly the unsurpassable best. Thus, the empirical claim
has in it an evaluative aspect, as made clear by the fact
that it is only the state-guided and the big-firm species that
get formally presented as having strengths and
weaknesses. The other two are just black or white.
This evaluative aspect is rooted in the common macro-
economic concern with growth. For the authors,
technological advance yields economic growth when
entrepreneurial innovation is translated into large-scale
production of the resulting products or services. The
mechanics of this observation turn on two things. The first
is a distinction between replicative entrepreneurial
activity-think of an additional McDonald's franchisee in
1970-and innovative entrepreneurial activity, the creation
and introduction of disruptive technology that brings forth
Schumpeterian "creative destruction." The second is the
importance of the large-scale firm for the commercialization
of entrepreneurial innovation. Thus, capitalisms are good to
the extent that they allow or encourage both innovative
entrepreneurial activity and the translation of the fruits of
innovation by large-scale firms into salable products or
services so as to facilitate economic growth. Capitalisms are
bad capitalisms to the extent that they hamper innovative
entrepreneurial activity and its translation into new
products or services so as to impede growth.
53. BAUMOL, LITAN & SCHRAMM, supra note 8, at 60-92.
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One might be forgiven for seeing in this formulation of
economic growth a technological determinism similar to
Reich's, were it not that Baumol and his associates, like
Hall and Soskice, present a static model. So, while like
Reich, Baumol and his associates have a problem of
explaining the roots of differences between capitalisms,
they need not explain change. Interestingly though, they,
unlike many economists, do not use some mathematical
index of growth to identify degrees of good and bad
capitalism. Instead, like Hall and Soskice, Baumol and his
associates use North's idea of economic institutions as the
root of their explanation of differences between their four
species of capitalism.
They start with the assertion that "state-guided
capitalism exists where governments . . . decide which ...
individual firms should grow. Government economic policy
is then geared to carry out those decisions . . . ,,54 The
model here is the economy of post-war Japan-though
designating individual firms, rather than sectors, for
growth seems not to be what Japan did-as extended by the
rest of the Asian Tigers: Hong Kong, Singapore, South
Korea, and Taiwan, maybe also Malaysia, Thailand, and/or
Indonesia. In these countries the mechanism of
administrative guidance-and occasionally ownership-of
banks, allows governments to target resources for
expansion toward preferred segments of the economy, often
export directed, and accompany those resources with
facilitative measures such as tariff protection and tax
policy. Prices are not state-dictated, though the existence of
facilitative measures such as tariff protection and non-tariff
barriers to trade have the effect of limiting the ability of
foreign firms to enter a market. This means that domestic
prices may tend to be higher than might otherwise be the
case were the government to adopt different measures and
policies, though interestingly Japan apparently had rather
vigorous domestic competition in its favored export markets
such a automobiles and electronics.
In oligarchic capitalism "government policies are designed
predominantly or exclusively to promote the interests of a very
narrow (usually very wealthy) portion of the population or..
54. Id. at 62-63.
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• the interests of the ruling autocrat and his (or her) friends
and family .... ,,55 The model here is a composite of parts of
Africa and South America, the various "stan" ex-Soviet
republics, Indonesia under Suharto, Iraq under Hussein, and
Syria under Assad pare. In these countries, often resource
rich, the main influence on government policy is not primarily
economic growth, though some is often essential to keep the
larger populace from open revolt, but rather the maintenance
and enrichment of the economic position of the oligarchy,
often including government officials themselves. Such
economies usually show wide disparities in the distribution of
wealth, a large informal economy and a relatively high degree
of corrupt behavior on the part of public officials.
Big-firm capitalism features "large, established
enterprises" with both "the resources to finance creative
activity" and "positions in their markets large enough to
earn profits sufficient to make the investment in the
development of innovations worthwhile. ' 56 The model is
Western Europe and the United States during the Twenties
through the Fifties, a relative of Reich's democratic
capitalism and Hall and Soskice's cooperative market
capitalism. Ownership is disbursed so that professional
managers lead what were once companies dominated by
their founder, bureaucratic organization is necessary
because of the size of the enterprise, and markets
characteristically support "only a few competitors who may
be able to take advantage of any significant economies of
scale provided by the current technology. ' 57 These markets
tend to be oligopolistic, showing modest control over price,
and to be a bit sluggish in capitalizing on innovation.
In entrepreneurial capitalism "large numbers of the
actors within the economy not only have an unceasing drive
and incentive to innovate but also undertake and
commercialize radical or breakthrough innovations. s58 The
model is the current United States, Reich's supercapitalism
and Hall and Soskice's liberal market capitalism.
Entrepreneurs tend to be single individuals or new firms.
Overall, few among them are wildly successful while most
55. Id. at 71.
56. Id. at 79.
57. Id. at 80.
58. Id. at 85-86.
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are failures, but those who are successful bring significantly
disruptive change to whatever portion of the economy their
innovations are focused on and tend to earn outlandish
returns on their investments. The disruptiveness of an
economy in which openness to technological innovation
tends to destroy firms utilizing old technology leads to the
establishment of social "safety nets that [partially] shield
some of the victims of change from its harsh impacts ... .59
It would be easy to complain about the stereotypical,
almost cartoonish rendering of these four species of
capitalism. For such a complaint to form, one needs only to
recognize that the United States endures a level of income
inequality higher than all OECD countries including
Turkey and remarkably close to that of several archetypical
South American oligarchies-Bolivia, Ecuador, and
Uruguay.60 Likewise, one might remember that our
economy is rife with oligopolies that dominate the
production of many consumer goods, from toothpaste to
gasoline. Indeed, some might be tempted to criticize the
entire book as little but an exercise in shilling for the
American style of entrepreneurial capitalism. However,
doing so would waste the opportunity that the book
provides for furthering inquiry into the aspects of the
varieties of capitalism. For this purpose the division of
capitalism into four types by Baumol and his associates is
wholly adequate, more adequate than the Marxism's three,
or Reich's and Hall and Soskice's two, all discussed
earlier. 61 So, I wish to continue this inquiry into the
varieties of capitalism with the analytical lever-
technological advance, work at what is repeatedly and
romantically called the "economic frontier," yields economic
growth-that Baumol and his associates use.
At the outset, it must be remembered that every
economist is in favor of economic growth. Unfortunately,
what is meant by the term is anything but obvious. One
might initially suspect that growth, seen as an increase in
59. Id. at 91.
60. Id. at 72.
61. Brian Holland helped me to notice that all four typologies fail to
encompass either the current South or East Asian varieties of capitalism or the
Russian one.
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quantity, is merely a synonym for good, except that
suburban growth is said to be an example of sprawl and
thus bad. Gross Domestic Product and Median Family
Income are most often used when considering national or
large regional economies, particularly by international and
other governmental agencies and economic think tanks.
Also popular are employment rates and changes in labor or
total factor productivity. These measures ignore the
distribution of income among citizens (and non-citizen
residents). Whether this limitation discloses a deep
ideological bias or is just a matter of data availability-both
are asserted-is not clear. What is clear is that such
statistics are regularly supplemented with measures such
as infant mortality and poverty rates, where decreases are
good, and childhood vaccination and life expectancy, where
increases are good, not that these measures do not also
disclose potential ideological bias. Years in school is also a
common measure, though no one has yet suggested that a
society consisting of only professional degree holders and
their not yet professionally accredited children would
possess the perfect economy. Also popular are
environmental measures-air and water pollution, where
decreases are good, and recycling, renewable energy
production, and species protection, where increases are
good. This list goes on and on and is no less freighted with
not so hidden meaning. Finally, there are the truly crazed
who see an increase in asset prices such as homes and
securities as a measure of economic growth, as if inflation
from the effects of limitations in supply only occurred in
goods destined for short term consumption.
As best as I can tell, all of the preceding measures
imply that economic growth is good, but also that people
cannot agree about what kind of economy they believe
growth ought to lead to. All likewise demonstrate the
confusion/conflation of economic growth and economic
health, not wholly surprising in a species subject to the
second law of thermodynamics, but still not helpful.
Perhaps all that one can say with confidence about
economic growth is that it brings economic change that
when somehow measured might be good or bad.
The rabid Schumpeterians who measure potential
growth by counting patents issued on the assumption that
more patents mean more new technology and more new
technology means economic growth, offer the occasion for
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critically looking at the understanding of technology that
Baumol and his associates favor. Here again, one uncovers
difficulties with what every economist believes, for
technology is often an ambiguous force in the lives of
humans. Consider the following story.
I started practice back before the invention of the
personal computer. I would hand-write my letters,
documents, pleadings, and briefs, then turn them over to
my shared secretary for typing. While she (I have known
only one male secretary in my life) typed, I had time to read
the paper and my mail, return phone calls previously
carefully logged by the receptionist, and even start the next
writing project. When my typing came back, it was easy to
edit because it was in a physical form I did not recognize.
Moreover, while I waited I had been forced to do something
else and so had forgotten what I actually had written, if
only a bit, but still remembered what I had intended to say,
an additional help when editing.
Today I share my secretary, not with one other person,
but with five other faculty members. She mostly does work
significantly below her skill level because we all do our own
typing, in my case proving each day that the "C" I earned in
a typing class taken one summer during high school was
given in recognition of my regular attendance alone. The
pace at which work is expected is such that only classes and
family life come between one draft and another; phone calls
regularly interrupt writing as I answer my own phone.
Editing is now much harder intellectually, though not
physically, since when I once waited between drafts, now
the printer allows me to start over in a few minutes and the
font remains the same unless I intentionally change it, a
change that makes the process of inputting editorial
changes physically more difficult.
Clearly, I have experienced a significant technological
advance in the conditions of my writing over these 35 years.
Has this innovation yielded economic growth? Put aside the
question of whether over time my written output has
increased, or more likely declined, in value. It is obvious
that my output costs less by one-third of a secretary and
maybe one-twentieth of a receptionist. If economic growth is
measured by summing costs for a given amount of output,
growth has surely occurred. But such sums do not exhaust
the value question. Here I do not wish to speak of the
amortized cost of my computer and networked printer as
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against my share of the amortized cost of a typewriter.
Rather, there is a cost to me of switching from having an
office and half a secretary to having an office and one sixth
of a secretary, if only the loss of humility from having to
admit to that secretary who had patiently typed and
returned to me the latest draft of the opening pages of a
book chapter I had been working on, that on reading her
efforts, it was obvious, even to me, that after five summers
my work was still shit, for I still had no idea what I was
talking about. Now, the only creature who may know that a
similar project has again gone nowhere is the family cat
who prefers this outcome since, in such circumstances, he
can claim more of my attention.
However, set me aside, a good idea on many grounds.
Consider the social costs of the diminution in status of my
secretary's role. When I started working, secretarial work
provided mostly clean-in all honesty I should not suppress
the stains from carbon paper and mimeograph ink-white-
collar jobs for bright lower-middle class girls with high
school educations, or at most a year or two of community
college. Such jobs brought money home, if not always
independence from family, before, and while awaiting
children after, marriage, not to mention for a much longer
time period if marriage never happened or was never
wanted or was not permitted. These jobs were part of the
backbone of lower middle and working class ethnic
communities. Today, their equivalent in terms of status and
independent dependence-the administrative assistant-is
a less numerous occupation that requires a college degree, a
significant outlay for families in such communities. It is not
clear, to me at least, in what sense the demise of many such
secretarial jobs and the creation of fewer administrative
assistant ones is the kind of increase in economic health
meant to be indicated by the term "economic growth."
Perhaps here too all that one can say with confidence is
that new technologies bring economic change that, when
measured, somehow might be either good or bad.
Now, I should not be here read as waxing nostalgic
about my Fifties childhood and late Sixties young
adulthood, for I spend much of my time fighting such
nostalgia. I wish only to suggest that in a relative
democracy humans might possibly prefer to live in the older
world that I experienced where industry-wide bargaining
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with entrenched oligopolies created comfortable
bureaucratic lives for many people. Indeed, I find it odd
that, given the overriding concern for consumer sovereignty
in the economic literature of the last thirty years,
economists who champion economic growth and
technological innovation, as all economists do, never
mention the possibility that, when choosing the kind of
capitalism they wish to live under, some, many, most, or
almost all citizens might prefer something other than a
single-minded focus on economic growth, whatever that
might be and however measured, and whether derived from
technological innovation or not. Thus, one of the ways to
understand the differences between capitalisms might be
that in a relative democracy humans could support-design
is too strong a word-institutions that would forego, or at
least postpone, a certain amount of the economic growth
that derives from technological advance.
Why might that be so? Schumpeter, from the comfort of
his tenured academic appointment, hailed capitalism for
the creative destruction that it brings. Now his vision of
that agent of capitalism, the entrepreneur, as destroyer,
was a romantic, perhaps even an aesthetic, not a utilitarian
one, much as was the case with Veblen's vision of the
engineer as innovator. Oddly, given how Schumpeter's
famous phrase has come to be understood, he believed that
the bureaucrats would take over management of the
economy from the entrepreneurs and so smother capitalism.
Still, whatever one might have been his intention, today
entrepreneurial creative destruction is a value widely
shared.
Evidence of this sharing appears in the oddest of places.
A provost at my university had a sign on his door echoing
Schumpeter. It read, "Change is Good." The securely
comfortable academics who labored under this provost's
real care and concern did not buy into the message
conveyed by this sign even a bit. Indeed, their attitude
toward change, however implausible, was remarkably close
to the legend on a t-shirt I see on undergraduates from time
to time-"'Life's a bitch and then you die." Though many
humans, even some academics if they may be categorized as
such, enjoy gambling as a form of entertainment, when it
comes to the structure of their lives, academics, like most
humans, are significantly risk averse. They like stability
and fear change. Indeed, one of the collateral attractions of
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socialism for late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century
workers was the fact that it promised some shelter in their
lives from the maelstrom of change that accompanied the
growth of industrial capitalism in those years. That
attraction remains for many contemporary workers,
industrial or otherwise, who know little about socialism
beyond what they were delivered in their ideologically
blinkered high school and/or college courses, and so who
would never consider a socialist alternative.
Only a fool would believe that Schumpeterian
entrepreneurial capitalism respects stability and dampens
change. At the same time, even a fool would have to admit
that this brand of capitalism has brought improvements to
daily life. The Provost's sign is thus correct. Change is often
good for the society as a whole . . . but not therefore for all
members of that society. However much city life improved
from the decline in the number of horses, the amount of the
associated waste, and the rats who came along for the fun,
and however much the mobility of Americans, especially
rural Americans, increased, the rise of the horseless
carriage did not bring joy into the hearts of either buggy
whip or carriage manufacturers and their respective
employees. Neither hatters nor haberdashers rejoiced when
John F. Kennedy chose to go hatless to his inauguration.
They too could see that change was coming and it would not
be personally rewarding.
Whether change is technological or only sartorial,
though it may bring general economic improvement in the
form of economic growth measured someway, contrary to
what the economists tell us over and over, the economic tide
rarely, if ever, raises all boats, much less all boats equally.
For some humans the long run will never come. Remember:
Life's a bitch and then you die. For some, maybe many,
flood tide will be seen only by their children who may or
may not have a boat, but surely would have had a better
chance of floating in one had their parents not had to sell
their boat when the ebb tide left them high and dry. Faced
with such short-run effects, societies might easily differ in
either their openness to change or their response to it or
both. Based on such differences in attitude, they might
build, or just let flourish, institutions or structures that
shape markets in particular ways, that differentiate species
of the genus capitalism. Thus, while institutions may be
very important for understanding the various capitalisms,
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this grab bag of disparate things, that might be modified or
cast over in the pursuit of supposed economic growth, may
be of most importance as constituting, or being indicative
of, a society's response to economic change.
Having puzzled over the notion of economic growth,
questioned the belief that technological change brings
growth, and noted the unsurprising aversion of humans to
technological, as well as other change, it is appropriate to
reconsider several matters urged earlier. The recognition
that one can alter the rules and institutions that make up a
given structure of capitalism does not imply that any such
alteration will have no impact on economic growth. All
possible economic structures or market systems do not
foster growth equally. Incentives make a difference when it
comes to risking capital by engaging in financings bottomed
on the hope for future gain. Risk and reward are always
and intimately related when it comes to the willingness of
people to undertake a financing. Structures or systems that
make up an economy act to manipulate risk and reward.
They both directly and indirectly work to make economic
growth harder or easier.
For example, the institution of a freer trade regime will
make certain financings seem more plausible than before-
those that depend on access to less costly foreign goods-
and certain financings less plausible-those that depend on
the unavailability of those foreign goods. These alternatives
are seldom symmetrical. In most cases the freer trade
regime will foster increased growth measured somehow, at
least if equilibrium ever is reached, though all people will
not experience that growth as good. Still, one might deal
with the underlying asymmetricality of experience by not
accepting a freer trade regime or by ignoring it or by
redistributing some, most, or all of the gains derived from
growth through taxation and spending.
The case of technological innovation is similar. It will
create some new possibilities in the lives of some
Americans, and at the same time end certain actualities in
the lives of some Americans. The possibilities gained and
actualities lost are seldom symmetrical. In many, perhaps
most, cases technological innovation will foster growth that
is perhaps evidence of economic health. And again one
might deal with the underlying asymmetricality of
experience by rejecting the new technology either by the
manipulation of intellectual property law or taxation or
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other forms of regulation or by embracing the new
technology or by redistributing some, most, or all of the
gains from growth through taxation or spending.
Though formally these are real choices that face any
society, as a Marxian would recognize, the history of that
society changes, and so over time limits by making more or
less plausible, the range of possible choices. Still, the basic
point remains the same. A society might act intentionally, if
not therefore effectively, to limit or retard what is
conventionally understood and so measured as growth, and
specifically growth from technological innovation, as a way
of dealing with the asymmetrical effects of such change.
What then can one say about the many flavors at
capitalism's ice cream store? Let me start with the four that
Baumol and his associates offer up for our delectation.
Consider first the big-firm capitalism that Reich as well as
Hall and Soskice in their different ways recognize as part of
the landscape. A big tree provides the most shade. The big
firm, especially in an oligopolistic industry, is guaranteed to
be bureaucratic. Bureaucracy proliferates jobs, slows all
processes, including change, and most importantly,
provides many a place to hide. Bureaucracy may be
frustrating for people trying to get something done, but
ultimately it is warm. Tenures lengthen; wages rise. The
wolf will, of course, come to the door, but there will be a lot
of doors and retirement may come before he gets to yours.
Pensions are comforting, retiree health benefits too, and
yes, the money to pay either may run out, but who knows,
maybe you won't be around when that happens.
A society that chooses, or accepts as a good default rule,
the big-firm model of capitalism sees change as best
managed down, worked out so that the last person leaving
may turn out the lights. Equally important, such a society
recognizes that the period for returning an investment in
capital goods is significantly shorter than a working life.
For individual workers, skills do not accumulate over a
working life in the way that invested capital is supposed to
accumulate. Redeploying capital after ten to twenty years is
far easier than redeploying labor after the same number of
years. In the no more than five-year horizon of the private
equity crowd, redeployment of labor is impossible, except
for the most flexible of recent college grads in low-level
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administrative jobs and computer jockeys, once the love of
the venture capital crowd, both of whom share an even
shorter attention span. This is not a matter of old dogs and
new tricks, but of sunk costs that have created a life that,
though fragile to the cosmos, is solid to the humans in
question. Thus, in a big-firm capitalism it is important that
the last person leaving will have lived a working life to that
last day and that last task. Such a society is willing to trade
less of what is conventionally seen as economic growth for
longer periods of individual, and so social, stability. This is
not a dumb trade, however difficult it might be to pull off in
practice.
Societies that espouse big-firm capitalism often support
various types of social insurance, especially unemployment
insurance and old age pensions. Here one may see at work
the democratic element of a society-both the aspect of a
society's psyche that rhetorically supports more citizen
participation in governance and those citizens who work to
assure such-though seldom the egalitarian element-both
the aspect of a society's psyche that rhetorically supports
greater equality, especially economic equality among its
citizens, and those citizens who work to assure such. The
democratic element seems to recognize that the economic
world does not consist only of big trees and that big firms
are not wholly to be trusted to provide shelter until the
last person retiring can turn off the lights. Change will be
slowed, but no one expects it to be halted. Accordingly,
some of life's risks need to be borne through somewhat
collective mechanisms.
That there is an implicitly political/governmental
aspect to my intentionally distanced sociological prose is
made explicit by a fork in the road that leads from big-firm
capitalism to either the state-guided or the oligarchic form.
Consider next the state-guided form. Change may be
encouraged, welcomed, or even forced by the state
apparatus. However, the state-guided form suggests that,
at least at election time, there will surface a certain obvious
worry that corporate bureaucracies are narcissistic, that
left to their own devices, oligopolistic firms may forget their
role of providing shelter, and so in managing change.
This form, which can be found with relatively limited
auxiliary social programs as in the case of Japan, could be
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seen to imply a rather stronger democratic element to a
society than is the case with the big-firm form. The
existence of state-guidance might suggest that the state will
keep large economic actors from straying too far from their
sheltering role, as the German state has done under its
version of large-firm capitalism. On the other hand, the
lack of concern for those whose economic activities are
outside the areas of state guidance might suggest that such
a society has a rather weaker democratic element than is
the case with big-firm form. And some observers note that
both species of capitalism can easily deform into a world
where those included within the ambit of concern, those
who are shut in, receive all of the intended benefits of that
concern, but those without the ambit of concern for
whatever reason-alienage, employment sector, ethnicity,
gender, etc.-those who are shut out, receive almost none.
So, in some sense, the question of a stronger or weaker
democratic element in either species of capitalism may not
be all that important. Cela ddpend.
Contrast the oligarchic form of capitalism, which might
exist in a familial form, as in South and Central America,
but also may encompass a political oligarchy (lately called a
kleptocracy), or even a big-firm oligarchy, as might be the
case in natural resources rich countries. Here change is not
welcomed, but when it comes, concern for the impact of
change is centered in the oligarchy, the portion of the
society that needs it least. Thus, all three oligarchical
variants imply a relatively weaker democratic element to
the society. The peasants will always be with us.
Turning finally to the entrepreneurial form of
capitalism that Baumol and his associates trumpet, Reich
laments, and Hall and Soskice treat with studied
neutrality, some might argue that this form shares with the
oligarchic one a sense that the peasants will always be with
us. Here some care needs to be paid to the relationship
between economic "details" and political rhetoric.
Entrepreneurs tend to come from the upper portions of the
middle classes. The destabilizations their innovations cause
bring change to all. The upper classes can, however, ride
out those changes more easily; that is the nature of being
possessed of some capital, both financial and human, and so
of being the upper classes. And it is often the case that
portions of their financial capital are what support the big-
firm commercialization of innovation coming from the
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middle classes. Still, this is significantly different from
there being an oligarchy that resists innovation.
The lower classes, the peasants as it were, by definition
lacking capital other than the modest human capital that is
their labor skills, cannot ride out, much less profit from,
change in this manner. Here is where the relative strength
of the democratic element of a society needs to be carefully
understood. Democracy has an interesting history,
whatever might be said for its putative intellectual content.
Historically, the democratic element was bourgeois. Today
it is centered in the broader middle classes. There is a
difference between an economic or political oligarchy
defending its own interests and the middle classes doing
the same thing-even though the peasants experience no
difference in their lives. Class matters, though not in simple
ways. Still, the existence of a broader democratic element in
a society in no way implies that this element is egalitarian;
anything but.
A return to history of the American economy over the
past thirty or forty years that I sketched earlier would
make this clear. Ours is properly seen as a bourgeois
democracy, though of wider extent than the bourgeois
democracies of nineteenth century Europe. During recent
years our middle classes have experienced a level of
economic insecurity that, though hardly unprecedented,
they feel is unacceptable to their status. The result of this
insecurity is a significant reduction in support for the
progressive income tax and the modestly progressive real
property tax; even grudging support of the regressive sales
tax is down. Accompanying this increased reluctance to pay
taxes is a willingness to reduce governmental services
directed at other than the middle classes, a hostility toward
unionized and immigrant labor, a continuous search for
maximizing investment income-with dubious results in
many cases-and a growth in indebtedness. All of these
preferences have the effect of maximizing the disposable
income that is part of maintaining a middle class status
and so is anything but egalitarian. Taken together they
suggest a plausible addition to the usual political bromides.
A bourgeois democracy under stress is not a pretty sight.
Now to shift focus from relative democracy to
egalitarian considerations ought immediately to raise a
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glaring absence in Baumol and his associates' typology, not
to mention Reich's and Hall and Soskice's-socialism.
Socialism is, of course, the alternative to capitalism, n'est
pas? The assumption that by altering the ownership of the
means of production one avoids capitalism is deeply
engrained in political economy worldwide. Both the
capitalists and the remaining socialists harp on this
difference in their economic models. Indeed, Baumol and
his associates and other economists repeatedly stress that
with the fall of the Iron Curtain in 1989, the socialist ideal
has been proven to be an inadequate economic alternative.
However, before one concludes that questions of socialism,
and so of the ownership of the means of production, have
been swept off the table by the fall of a wall in Europe, one
might say of socialism, what Shaw said of Christianity, that
it has never been tried and so cannot be found wanting.
State socialism of the Soviet form is, at best, but one form of
the socialist ideal, just as American entrepreneurial
capitalism is but one form of the capitalist ideal. Thus, it is
sensible to look more carefully at what aspects of an
economy socialism assumes.
Though it is not wrong to distinguish "capitalism" from
"socialism," as those terms are understood in debates over
political economy, by focusing on the ownership of the
means of production, to use the private ownership of those
means as the mark of capitalism is quite problematic.
Capitalisms of all kinds are marked by the use of financings
to shift value between time periods. Socialism in no sense
implies an exclusively barter economy, the trading of
present goods and/or services for present goods and/or
services. Indeed, the iconic and much maligned Five-Year
Plan implies that in state socialism there will be recurrent
questions about financings. Less statist, more communal
socialisms will face these questions too.
Once the ubiquity of financings among the various
socialist alternatives is recognized, it is at least arguable
that socialism is simply another species of capitalism, but
one where the decisions with respect to a society's stock of
goods and the direction of that society's available services,
and so decisions with respect to what financings are to be
undertaken, are questions to be answered by some group
other than would be the case were that stock of goods and
available services "privately" owned. Concomitantly, if
those financings are successful, the profits, should there be
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any, that the chosen financings may bring might be
captured by that other group; they have not simply been
forgone. Losses might be similarly shared.
Given the fundamental participation of socialist
societies in capitalism, it is clearer that the classic
distinction between socialism and capitalism is not about
the ownership of the means of production. Indeed, the
historical differentiation of socialism from capitalism was,
and remains, a rhetorical device, much like that of Baumol
and his associates, for separating good (socialistic)
capitalism from bad (individualistic) capitalism. This
differentiation is about the private control of the
productivity of labor, not about the core of capitalism as an
economic institution. Wage slavery and economic inequality
are the real and important issues, not financings.
By suggesting that socialism is a species of capitalism I
am not trying by sleight of hand to reduce important
questions to a definitional quibble. To thus understand
socialism is to understand better the range of
considerations that might distinguish economic forms. Like
the other capitalisms, socialism needs to confront questions
of financing, of the role of the democratic element of society,
and of managing economic change. Consider first financings
in the form of socialism that we know best.
The Iron Curtain did not necessarily fall because
socialism is an implausible economic scheme. On reflection,
it seems to have fallen because it could not solve its
financing problems. This may have been due to economic
isolation imposed by the West, though some of that
isolation was self-imposed, but this is surely not the entire
story. Financings in any society, socialist or capitalist, will
come from some combination of profits earned and/or wages
foregone and/or taxes collected, plus a bit of inflation.
Financings may be directed in the hope of what is
conventionally seen as economic growth or not, but if not,
and if a steady state economy cannot be constructed,
eventually the economy of that society will contract.
As Mancur Olson has argued, once Stalin achieved
control, the Soviet system financed its economy by
collecting all of the profits of the country's enterprises
centrally and maximized those profits by setting workers'
piece rates in a way that increased the wage earner's
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incentive to produce. 62 These centrally gathered profits
were then redirected to support the growth of capital-
intensive industry. Productivity grew at fantastic rates. In
the end, however, sclerosis set in. This was because after
the end of the Stalinist terror, bureaucrats and eventually
workers colluded against the central planners to skim off
profits for themselves. Financings became increasingly
problematic as a parallel economy arose alongside the
official one. And so, the parallel economy came to
undermine the economy as a whole.
Thus, in the end, the Soviet state apparatus was not
earning enough from such financings as it could undertake
to avoid economic implosion. However, such is not the
necessary end game of a socialist society. Whatever might
be the case in the historical record, a socialism might pay
attention to its profits locally, choose to invest them in a
mixture of entrepreneurial and social welfare projects, and
produce at least a steady state economy.
Consider next the role of the democratic element in a
society. Returning to allegedly first principles, "socialism,"
like "capitalism," posits that the profits from any financing
are to be captured by the owners of the means of
production. It is just that in socialism ownership will be
communal or state centered or some set of alternatives in
between, and deployed in the future by those owners,
presumably, though hardly necessarily, in the interests of
some broader group of citizens. Thus, the question of
ownership can be reduced to a question about the role of the
democratic element in the society and the implicit assertion
that by so structuring ownership the democratic element
may be fused with the egalitarian ideal.
However, increasing the democratic element in the
direction of the egalitarian ideal still does not eliminate the
question of financing. The egalitarian socialist society
might finance on the basis of communal profits and/or
wages forgone and/or some scheme of state taxation, but
financings there will be. Indeed, the endless, surely
occasionally apocryphal, stories about the Soviet production
of goods that no one wanted are simply evidence of
financings that didn't work out. Financing heavy industry
62. See MANCUR OLSON, POWER AND PROSPERITY: OUTGROWING COMMUNIST
AND CAPITALIST DICTATORSHIPS 114-19 (2000).
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or not, the production of consumer goods or not, agricultural
export production or not are all choices about financings.
Similar questions arise when considering the question
of change and its management. The choice to favor
technological innovation that disrupts existing socialist
investments or not is nothing more or less than a choice of
where to direct financings. The success of the financings
chosen will have something to say about economic growth
and popular welfare. It will also say something about the
various possible choices with respect to managing the
inevitable personal costs of disrupting current economic
relationships, of managing change. However, these are the
same choices that various possible "capitalisms" make in
their own ways too. It is thus ideological bias that leaves
the socialist alternative out of the range of possible
capitalisms, a bias that can be seen on the part of"socialists" and "capitalists" alike.
All of which is not to say that there really is no
difference between capitalist capitalism and socialist
capitalism. As Bert Westbrook regularly reminds me, there
is no joy in socialism, no animal spirits such as might make
the metaphor of players and game appropriate. Socialisms
are sober, not playful. They do not wish to recognize the
transformation in a person's status that accompanies
economic success, the becoming one of the masters of the
universe. Socialisms are also chary of risk, seeing that it is
best born widely and so rewarded widely. Players, however
defined, in socialist games are quite cautious when they
choose whether to play or not, as well as in how they play.
None of this should be surprising in a social theory born in
the multiple dislocations that accompanied the shift from a
predominantly agricultural to a more industrial society.
However, to emphasize caution when undertaking
financings is not to forswear capitalism, but rather to make
a choice among various possible capitalisms.
And likewise, as Betty Mensch equally regularlyreminds me, serious problems with incentives, and so
signaling, are likely to be found in any system of
administered prices such as may be part of some possible
socialisms. The Stalinist attempt to build and direct capital
accumulation for the development of heavy industry that
was mentioned earlier is a long way from the medieval
notion of fair price, tied as it was to notions of social justice
inherent in the great chain of being. The two justifications
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for administered prices signal quite different schemes of
value and so imply far different capitalisms.
Still, by understanding the basic affinities between
supposedly different, even antagonistic, economic systems
one might then be able to see that none of the forms of
capitalism, including that capitalism that is socialism,
imply any tight relationship to, or attitude toward,
economic change, though they may imply a loose
relationship to the democratic element of government. 63 As
I noted earlier, I doubt that there are linear paths here.
Which is not to say that someone could not attempt to imply
one. The form of capitalism that is seen as the socialist
ideal implies the strongest possible democratic element to
government and so a linear relationship might be drawn
back from it through state-guided capitalism to big-firm
capitalism.64 However, the existence of the various forms of
oligarchical capitalism and so the possibility-which I
suspect is an actuality--of various forms of state-guided
capitalism suggests that such a relationship would be
difficult to support. Indeed, extending the putative linear
relationship through entrepreneurial capitalism into
socialism's bate noir, laissez-faire capitalism, suggests the
degree to which a political narrative, an attractive one I
might add, is overriding a rather more chaotic set of
63. Here I might note that no one should be surprised were it to turn out to
be the case that the socialist forms of capitalism would share an aversion to
change similar to that of the oligarchic ones. The very large overlap of political
power and the economic beneficiaries of capitalism in either society is likely to
produce such aversion, lest lives of the powerful be disrupted. Still, this is
anything but a necessary relationship for capitalism, as the vaguely socialist
economies of the Scandinavian countries demonstrate. And the problem is
hardly unknown within other varieties, witness the endless confrontations of an
effective monopolist-Microsoft-with the European Union competition
authorities over intellectual property. Power does tend to dislike being
dislodged.
64. Such line-drawing exercises bring to the fore the question of the
distinction between socialist capitalism and state-guided capitalism. If one
assumes that socialist capitalism is the state socialist variety, then the
difference is just one of degree, as guidance slides imperceptibly into direction
and then more and more into ownership. The communal forms of socialist
capitalism that might be envisioned are more difficult to place into a pattern
with contemporary forms. They seem to me either to hearken back to Jefferson's
yeoman farmer or to Veblen's more recent idealization of the engineer. The
intermediate steps in the change of forms to something more recognizable today




alternative approaches toward economic change, including
not just the extent of the democratic element, but also
something that has only peripherally appeared in this
discussion, the size of the units of economic life. And it is
the putative attachment to such a narrative that leads me
to my earlier, harsh suggestion that Baumol and his
associates are acting as shills for entrepreneurial
capitalism, since there are lots of possible capitalisms that
vary on multiple axes. Still, as was the case earlier with the
various possible understandings of "institution," I see no
reason to suggest my own names for the various possible
varieties of "capitalism" to be found in that multi-
dimensional space either. Indeed, I even eschew theorizing
about the totality of possibilities. No one will listen.
By now it ought to be apparent that I am not at all
convinced by the typology of capitalisms argued for by
Baumol and his associates. And the fact that both Reich
and Hall and Soskice agree on the existence of two of these
species, though with a different political valence to be sure,
cuts no ice either. If forced to choose I prefer the Marxian
tripartite division with all of its problems, especially if the
stutter is removed and the third variety of capitalism is
seen as service capitalism. The concepts commercial,
industrial, and service tie into the notion of institution in a
significantly more consistent way than do the concepts at
the root of Baumol's division. State-guided capitalism has
the state as its central institution; oligarchical capitalism,
the family or The Families; big-firm capitalism, democratic
capitalism or coordinated market economies, the
eponymous big-firm; and entrepreneurial capitalism,
supercapitalism or liberal market economies, the
entrepreneur. A political entity, a filial or social
relationship, a subspecies of the corporation and an attitude
toward technology can be gathered together in no
particularly consistent way. However, I have no interest in
arguing this point beyond what I have already done. That
form of capitalism called socialism is still a tough sell;
Marxism is too.
At the same time I do not wish to suggest that the
problems with division of capitalism into four species by
Baumol and his associates, or the simpler division's of Reich
or Hall and Soskice, renders these efforts worthless any
more than did the deficiencies in North's category
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"institutions." To have engaged in the enterprise alone is
valuable, for doing so raises important questions about
economic organization that have been suppressed for
ideological reasons for far too long-at least over 100 years.
Still, I would like to think that I have at least provided a
basis for suggesting that it is possible that the product of all
of these authors' efforts is better when treated as a
diagnostic tool for understanding the political economy of
various societies than as a description of the type of
capitalist economy shared by those societies. 65
To ask what kind of capitalism is found in this or that
particular society is to focus on something very important
in that society ... how it is organized, where political power
is located, what values are expressed by various portions of
the society, how it treats change, how it keeps stasis from
turning into ossification. These are not the only questions
that might be asked of a society, but they are important
ones, ones that might help to decide what variety of
capitalist economy might fit that society. At the very least,
answers to these questions might help to understand why a
society has the variety of capitalist economy that it has.
It would be a mistake, of course, to assume that the
answers given to these questions reflect intentionality in
the narrowest sense. Human enterprises misfire in an
astonishing variety of ways all the time. Still, if one comes
to understand the choices that various societies appear to
have made with respect to their economic organization, that
knowledge might provide a basis for suggesting an
alteration in one's own, and after all, that is the point of
books such as Supercapitalism,66 Varieties of Capitalism,67
and Good Capitalism, Bad Capitalism.68 Here then might
be found the payoff for the individual interested in doing
policy from learning that perhaps these authors have
worked backwards-from economic policy to society. After
all, done by adults, which may seldom be the case but still
65. Christina Falk, an astute field botanist, prompted me to articulate this
aspect of my response to these authors' work.
66. REICH, supra note 9.
67. Hall & Soskice, supra note 10.
68. BAUMOL, LITAN & SCHRAMM, supra note 8.
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ought to be the standard, it is a lot of work to articulate
policy prescriptions, work that is often Sisyphean in nature.
One might alter the nature of the enterprise and possibly
improve the result were one to work from society to policy
rather than to use any of these authors' templates as a
basis for deciding what that society's economy ought to look
like, especially if one takes marginalism in economics
seriously.
Reich, the seasoned political economist and experienced
bureaucrat, has little difficulty in understanding the
implications of marginalism. 69 In contrast, why Baumol and
his associates, like most economists, the self-appointed
custodians of marginal price theory, can only accept
marginal social change reluctantly is one of the great
mysteries of intellectual life.
Examples of such reluctance can be seen in passages in
the second half of Good Capitalism, Bad Capitalism where
the authors present a series of policy prescriptions designed
to help various economies become more entrepreneurial and
so grow more quickly. These prescriptions are not
surprising as they follow from much of the literature on
entrepreneurism, but are also not stupid for they recognize
that economic policy analysis, unlike legal policy analysis,
lacks a judicial mechanism that uses the notion of rights as
a trump card that makes things seem to happen
instantaneously, and so they offer their suggestions quite
conscious of the potential political opposition to change. As
a result, the authors explicitly engage in a real assessment
of the costs, benefits, and incentives necessary for change to
occur, rather than, as law professors do, shadow boxing
with hypothetical, abstracted interests, old favorites such
as security of transactions, fairness, compensation for
injury, blah, blah, blah.
Interestingly, this modest, real world constraint means
that because their policy prescriptions will result in
disrupting established economic/political relations, Baumol
and his associates recognize that most policy change will
come incrementally and at the margin, and so economic
change will come slowly as well, absent an economic crisis
severe enough for citizens to be willing to question existing
policy decisions wholesale. After all, most humans enjoy
69. See generally REICH, supra note 9, at 127-28.
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growth, but surely prefer it without change; they love the
exhilaration of bubbles, but wish them regularly pricked
by regulators. 70 These authors are not therefore happy
with this constraint.
Consider the following. Baumol and his associates
acknowledge the resistance of workers to accelerated
economic change and so the necessity of providing them
with some form of wage insurance in order to secure their
approval of an entrepreneurial capitalist society. That this
is but a concession to political necessity, and a grudging one
at that, can be seen from the fact that such wage insurance
is to be for a rather short duration-two or three years, far
less than it might take for an average individual's
investment in employment specific skills to work its way
down toward zero. Likewise, these authors' recurrent
dismissal of any behavior designed to secure legal
protection from economic change as "rent-seeking" seems to
me to be related to their implicit unhappiness with
marginal change. After all, one man's rent-seeking
behavior-tariff protection for a declining industry or
regulator protection from an emerging competitive
technology-may easily be another's protection from the
storm of economic change, an attempt to acquire modest
support by invoking the democratic element in a society for
insulation from the effects of such change. Similarly
grudging is the authors' recognition, again born of practical
politics, that existing, other than entrepreneurial economic
structures are unlikely to be dismantled all at once.71
In defense of their unhappiness with marginal social
change, Baumol and his associates from time to time deploy
everyone's friend, The Public Interest, in an attempt to
capture the high ground of argument. Reich does something
similar though he hides it in the cloak of appealing to our
interests as citizens, rather than as consumers and
investors. However one phrases it, The Public Interest
provides no high ground, except rhetorically. The integrity
70. Steve Marshall came up with this lovely way of describing a recurrent
pattern of human behavior when confronted with economic change.
71. Of like tenor is their general argument in favor of a shift toward a more
entrepreneurial capitalist economy on the grounds that it is the only way
existing social insurance programs can possibly be funded given current




of the public/private distinction as an empirical matter has
been pretty much discredited. Each word may or may not
mean "good" in the hands of various people with respect to
various political/economic disputes, since by definition, if
there is a private, even rent-seeking, interest there cannot,
as an empirical matter, be a public interest because some
portion of the actual public is opposed to that interest.
Thus, though it is implausible to expect economic discourse
to eschew the use of "public" and "private" and speak only of
interests, the authors' suggestion that fostering
entrepreneurial capitalism is in the public interest deserves
more than a little disaggregation into a discussion of discrete
sub-groups of the public and their differing attitudes toward,
if not interests in, economic change.
A disaggregatative view might suggest that Baumol
and his associates' preference for a more entrepreneurial
economy and thus for greater economic change, a preference
that I happen to share, says little or nothing about the
degree to which some, most or all of the democratic element
in a society supports their preference. It also fails to attend
to the conditions under which this element might increase
or decrease such support.72 At the very least, these
economists ought to recognize that, not only is support for
their implicit assumptions about the value of
entrepreneurial capitalism anything but a technical
economic issue of growth in gross national product, but that
the degree of protection for the victims (and I use that word
carefully) of Schumpeterian creative destruction is a
relevant question that might be decided in numerous ways.
And this is not just because there are economic trade-offs. It
is because there is no stable background outline of what
might be termed entrepreneurial capitalism against which
those trade-offs might be measured, any more than there is
a naturally free market or an ideally efficient one.
72. Mark Bartholomew, Associate Professor, University at Buffalo Law
School, asks why, as a society, the United States gets so much change, if so
many of us wish stability. Reich spends the last half of his book commenting on
the failures of democratic process that he attributes to the pervasiveness of
change at a time when there is a longing for stability, or at least protection from
the storm that change brings. I have a different explanation, though pursuing it
in detail is inappropriate in this context. However, review of the brief discussion
of the American class structure that I offer on page 1008 above would suggest
the content and direction of my thought.
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Here then is the importance of the understanding about
markets with which I began this excursion. Economy and
society have no natural state. We are making up the
existing state of affairs all the time, hopefully with good
arguments and not with assumptions that manage to avoid
hard issues. Institutions in the first sense-textualized
understandings of normative regimes-such as property
and contract, could be different and there still could be
capitalism. Likewise, the rule of law, after all is said and
done nothing more that a sensible preference for
bureaucratic regularity, could take multiple bureaucratic
forms, though by no means with identical results. Similarly,
institutions in the second sense-those formally organized
as such-could take multiple forms. The large investment
bank is hardly an essential part of a capitalist economy, as
we seem to be learning these days. Indeed, in continental
Europe its job once was largely done by commercial banks.
Stock exchanges don't have to trade all stocks during the
entire business day; stocks could trade just once each day. A
securities commission might pass on the suitability of debt
and equity instruments for sale in a manner similar to the
way that the motion picture industry's private regulator
does. Capitalism would not crumble. Financings would still
take place, though surely a different range of financings,
and equilibrium would still denote that the market had
reached the efficient solution to problems of supply and
demand.
Reich seems to understand all of this, though he does
not make himself, as Richard Nixon always did, perfectly
clear. He also understands one of the great strengths of
Marxist economic analysis-history has a ratchet effect, it
limits and changes the possibilities for going forward. Hall
and Soskice seem to understand both points as well, though
their pose as practitioners of the science part of political
science keeps them from offering policy prescriptions and so
of being perfectly clear as well.7 3 Baumol and his associates
do not, and I suppose that my criticism is likely to be hard
for them as economists to understand, when coming much
less accept, from a mere lawyer.
Economists live in a world where markets are good,
growth is good, and lowest cost, their meaning of efficient,
73. See generally Hall & Soskice, supra note 10, at 54-60, 62-66.
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is good too. I happen to like this much of their world. But
they also live in a world where the distribution of
entitlements is taken off the table because this topic is
contentious and makes the mathematics that is at the root
of contemporary economics impossibly complex and where
the distribution of gains and losses is presumed to be fair
because it is the result of allegedly neutral market
processes. I do not like this part of their world, however
much it supports their claim, similar to that implicitly
made by Hall and Soskice, to be doing science. The human
subjects review people keep reminding us, far too pickily for
my taste, that one doesn't do science with humans where
life or welfare might be implicated. That no humans are
maimed or killed when economics is done ought not to be
enough for economists who presumably believe that wealth
ought to count for something. Rather than a focus on
institutions, or even on the dominant forms of economic
activity, a focus on lives and sacred fortunes, to mangle a
quote from our founding fathers, might just be a better place
to start an analysis of the various flavors of capitalism.
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Good, even treasured friends caution, a gracious word
for object, that my choice to treat capitalism as marked by
financings, rather than, for example, any of the various
varieties of exploitation possible in the world where many
humans are necessitous and a far lesser number are not,
needs to be addressed. Others object to my omission of a
discussion of politics or power. Still others fault my blithe
unwillingness to specify what I mean by value. And then
there is my lack of specificity with respect to the actors in
an economy. For these and similar readers, I append this
note, knowing full well that it is not likely to provide a
satisfactory answer to any of their cautions.
I choose a seemingly technical understanding of
capitalism because I am convinced that most, if not all of
the more common definitions tell me more about the
political preferences of the individuals proffering them than
they do about the beast. This is not to say that such
definitions are wrong, but only that they are not right. They
are so freighted with value that they tend to obscure the
details of the processes that interest me and that I hope I
can interest others in as well. And so I choose a less
freighted definition in order to bring some of these details
to the fore.
To say that something is not wrong, but is not right, is,
of course, consciously to take a stand with respect to
contested methodillogical matters. I firmly believe that no
foundational positions are possible in political economy any
more than in law, or economics, or what have you, and this
piece acts on the basis of that belief. None of the ancient
and honorable dichotomies-labor/capital, politics/economy,
individual/group, freedom/necessity, power/dependency,
objective value/subjective value, capitalism/socialism,
know/believe-are more than quite leaky buckets of
thought. None expresses ordinal significance. And each,
once deconstructed through the process of critique that all
of us know how to do, does not leave one term standing, but
both wounded and staggering. All denote answers to
unspecified questions, and for me it is those questions that
are more interesting, even more useful, than the answers
tendered.
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This set of intellectual circumstances, often (but
incorrectly, for it has always been the case) labeled the
post-modern condition, does not mean that we as citizens or
scholars cannot talk about law and economy, but only that
one is always talking partially, provisionally. An author
when recognizing the absence of a firm foundation for his or
her conclusions is not therefore stating a mere personal
opinion or belief, but to the extent that such person is
communicating to another human, is stating something
rooted in (always partially) shared meaning, the only
rooting that one can have, even after the good Bishop
Berkeley has kicked a stone and so stubbed his toe.
In my pursuit of an understanding of the American
economy I could have spent my time unraveling the things
that people value in great and wondrous detail or the many
and often creepy varieties of the ways that necessitous
dependency compromises freedom when having no choice
but to defer to power. I might have expanded on work
previously done by looking at the many and various ways
that politics shapes economies world-wide or contributed to
the continuing debates about methodological individualism
that litter the academic countryside. But I need not to have
done these things in order to speak on economy. Partial
critique of course leads, at best, to partial understanding,
but partial understanding is, I am afraid, all we ever will
have, for even the Greeks and Romans understood that
rhetoric was never more than partially, limitedly grounded.
They, of course, were afraid of rhetoric for just that reason
and ever since in Western philosophy we have sought to
assuage that worry by separating rhetoric from knowledge,
sometimes known as truth. Given the history of conflict
involving the West since at least the Ninth Century, it is
probably better to fear that rhetoric that claims to
represent truth than to be worried about that rhetoric that





As the acknowledgements make clear, most of this
essay is the result, not of reading books, but of talking with
people. So, much of what I have argued above could not be
traced in detail to the books on the following list. This list is
of books that over the past ten years were either helpful to
me or good foils for my growing ideas. I hope they may
prove to be suitably helpful or good foils for interested
readers as well. For such readers' convenience I have
included some of the books cited in the footnotes.
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